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Abstract
In this paper we study the impact of AGOA and CBTPA preferences on Sub-Saharan Africa and Caribbean
Basin beneficiaries respectively. The identification of the impact consists of modelling the selection in
exporting that occurs and accounting for the zero trade occurring at the HS-6 digit level of disaggregation
used in the paper. The AGOA impact has in the literature been found to be driven mainly by apparel
and textiles and oil and energy related products. We find evidence corroborating this, we do also find a
strong impact of the AGOA and CBTPA preferences for the beneficiary countries in non apparel and textile
products. Another result is that the strength of the estimated impact in several cases increases with the level
of product aggregation. Finally, not controlling for zero trade flows and the choice of panel data estimator
significantly biases the estimated impact. A large sample size as in our case in most cases attenuates this
bias and increases consistency.
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11 Introduction and Background
The United States of America (USA) has signed several preferential trade agreements with developing
countries. These include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offered to selected Sub-Saharan
African countries (SSA) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA) which were provided to
Caribbean Basin countries1. The CBTPA is part of the earlier Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) which was
launched as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) provided to the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries in the early 1980s. Although, we focus on the CBTPA preferences which were provided in 2000 we do
make references to the earlier CBI and CBERA preferences. There has been much debate in the literature
about the impact of these preferences for developing countries. These studies include the impact of AGOA
(for example, Brenton and Hoppe, 2006, Brenton and Ikezuki, 2004, Collier and Venables, 2007, Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck, 2010, Gibbon, 2003, Mattoo et al., 2003, Pa´ez et al., 2010, Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008)
and studies on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and
Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Area (CAFTA-DR) (Ames, 1993, Haar, 1990, Hornbeck,
2010, Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994, Ozden and Sharma, 2006, Yeboah et al., 2009).
All these studies are mixed in terms of the impact of the preferences on developing countries. We believe
that the mixed results can be attributed to the construction of the counter-factual by which the impact of the
preferences are measured. Collier and Venables (2007), Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) and Nilsson (2005)
tend to carry out their analysis by providing a means of measuring the performance of the preferential ben-
eficiaries by comparing their exports to the USA to that of the European Union (EU). We envisage that this
is important in isolating the impact of AGOA given that these countries also export to other regions and
also receive preferential treatment from these regions. In this paper, we instead control for the exports of
the developing countries to the rest of the world. This is done in order to also control for countries that in
addition to benefiting from the preferences of the US and/or the EU are also members of free trade areas
within their regions and hence have intra-regional trade which are exclusive of tariffs.
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) argue that the non-uniform preferences provided by AGOA and its se-
lective choice of countries from within the continent satisfy the requirement for analysing the policy impact
impact of AGOA. The CBTPA preference was also unilaterally applied to selected Caribbean and Latin
American Countries2. The variation in countries selected and products covered is employed in the analysis
to study the impact of the AGOA and CBTPA preferences on selected products at the 6 digit level of trade.
Besides, Agostino et al. (2007) also notes that in the absence of these preference agreements the average
level of trade becomes the counterfactual hence, adopting their idea—the introduction of the CBI and AGOA
would lead to a departure from the normal level of trade. This departure from the normal level of trade can
thus be interpreted as the effect of the policy.
In this paper the main question we ask is that, “has there been an observed increase in the exports of AGOA
recipients to the USA compared to their exports to the rest of the world?” In addition we, (1) estimate
the impact of the USA’s preferences on exports of developing countries given their exports to the rest of
the world (focussing on the AGOA, CBI and GSP preferences), (2) compare the impact at various levels
of disaggregated trade (3) compare AGOA to the CBTPA preferences noting any significant differences (4)
1Caribbean and Central American Countries: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas The, Barbados, Belize, British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos Islands
2The introduction of preferences in textiles and apparel within the CBTPA preference is used to model this variation in preferences
for Caribbean Basin countries
2determine which products have been the export drivers while comparing the importance of apparel in the
exports of the preference beneficiaries and (5) show that the results are robust to the choice of econometric
technique and not sensitive to controls included in the regressions. In doing this, we contribute to the exist-
ing empirical literature on USA preferences by controlling for the exports of developing countries to the rest
of the world. Secondly, we add to the few existing empirical work on the CBTPA preferences. In addition,
we also find support for the importance of apparel and textiles in AGOA (and CBTPA) exports as has been
underscored by for example Collier and Venables (2007) and Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010). Finally,
we show that with large N panels the random effects estimator is inconsistent and inefficient. However,
the Heckman two step procedure, fixed and Mundlak corrected random effects estimators provide similar
estimates.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the empirical literature and
some initial exploration of the data on preferential imports. Section 3 presents the data and methodology.
Section 4 presents econometric modelling issues that need to be addressed and section 5 is a discussion of
the results. The conclusion is provided in the final Section.
2 Review of the Empirical Literature
The AGOA and CBI preferences have undergone several amendments since their inception in 2000 (started
in 2001) and 1983 respectively. We provide a summary of these important revisions in the AGOA and CBI
preferences below. For the AGOA preferences the following revisions are noteworthy3:
• AGOA I - extended GSP product eligibility (4650 products); certain limitations (eg. competitive
needs legislation) removed; inclusion of 1835 products not covered in the GSP as duty free products.
• AGOA II - (2002) further relaxation of rules of origin in apparel and selected textile articles (eg. tow-
els & blankets, etc); knit-to-shape apparel included; rules of origin relaxed to include yarn; Botswana
and Namibia given LDC status; volume cap limit doubled
• AGOA III - extended AGOA to 2015 and apparel provisions to 2007, ethnic printed fabrics added;
use of foreign collars and cuffs in domestic garments allowed
• AGOA IV - (2006) Access given to LDC AGOA countries for HS 50 - 63; new rules of origin allowing
inputs to be sourced from the AGOA LDC group. Third country fabric extended to 2012; increase in
volume cap on garments.
• AGOA V - (Nov. 2009) single implementation of rules of origin; harmonisation and expansion of
USA preferences and extension of trade benefits currently available.
The CBI has also undergone several phases and these include4 :
• Launched in 1983 as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)
• 1984 - 20 countries received benefits (Includes El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Nicaragua in
1990).
• 1990 - CBERA made permanent and amended.
– 20 % tariff reduction on certain leather products
3www.agoa.info and AGOA reports to congress
4www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/preference-programs and USTR (2009)
3– Duty free treatment for products using 100% inputs from the US
• 1991 - 94 tariff categories added or expanded
• 1992 - 28 tariff categories added or expanded.
• 2000 - US Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act enacted.
– Added apparel exports
– This expires in 2010 (or if an FTA of the Americas comes into force)
• 2002 - CBERA amended
• 2006 - CAFTA-DR benefits begin for Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Costa Rica joins in 2009.
• The CBTPA has however, been extended for the remaining countries beyond 2010.
2.1 AGOA and Sub Saharan Africa
Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) use HS-2 digit disaggregated data to analyse the impact of AGOA on exports
of eligible countries to the US. In doing this they adopt a gravity model and they also separate the AGOA
impact into intensive and extensive margins 5. In addition to the standard gravity variables they include the
stock of immigrant population (per country) in the US, dummies for landlocked, AGOA eligibility, English
language, an index of economic openness, years elapsed under AGOA, lagged imports and time and country
effects. Using a tobit estimation technique they carry out regressions for each HS-2 digit product (that is
chapters 00 - 99) and decompose the coefficient of the AGOA dummy into extensive and intensive margin
effects.
Generally, the gravity coefficients had the expected signs—distance (-0.5) and economic size (0.495) for HS
03 products (that is fish and crustaceans). Moreover, US population and income levels had no significant
impact on AGOA imports in several of the HS-2 categories. AGOA had approximately a 64% increase in HS
03 imports although it was insignificant. The lag of the dependent variable (0.65) was significant in most
of their regressions. They reported both positive and negative immigrant stocks in several cases. The ex-
tensive and intensive margin effects reported by them for HS 01 products were 0.085 and 0.51 respectively
and significant. In relation to the decomposition, only a few products recorded significant values for both
effects—much less than the 24 significant extensive margin effects across products.
Collier and Venables (2007) estimate the impact of trade preferences on exports of developing countries to
the USA relative to the EU using total apparel exports. Their total sample was 110 developing and middle
income countries resulting from selecting countries with mean apparel exports of US$ 100,000 and above.
They capture the AGOA impact through a dummy variable indicating when the country was given AGOA
preferences. The main regressions are also estimated for a sub sample of 86 countries whose apparel exports
were US$ 1 million and above during 1991 - 2005. The coefficients for AGOAA (AGOA apparel dummy) in
their first three regressions were significant and varied from 2.00 to 2.21. The coefficients signify the strong
impact of AGOA in increasing exports to the US relative to the EU in apparel products. The actual impact
on exports to the US relative to the EU is given by the exponents of 2.00 and 2.21 which are 7.39 and 9.12
5They use the terms import initiation - creating new imports (extensive margin) and import intensification - the volume effect on
US imports (intensive margin).
4times the exports to the EU respectively. The result signifies an increase in AGOA country exports to the
USA relative to the EU by a multiple of 7.39 and 9.12 respectively.
On the contrary, they had an another dummy capturing the effect of the EU Everything but Arms (EBA)
preference on these countries. In order to identify the effect of the EBA they restricted their dummy to
countries that were ineligible for the European Union–African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferences.
This variable was not significant and in most cases had the wrong sign. Similarly, using the EBA dummy
in its place—it was also not significant and showed the wrong sign. Three subsequent regressions with 110
countries correct the sign for the EBA dummies and produces a marginal increase in the AGOAA coefficient.
A quadruple difference in difference method to sort out the effects of having between country characteristics
vary over time is also used. In the two regressions carried out with this method, the AGOAA effect recorded
significant values (2.65 and 1.98 respectively). The first regression excluded the AGOA and EBANC terms.
They therefore confirm that, AGOA had a large impact on its beneficiaries. We depart from Collier and Ven-
ables (2007) by expanding our product coverage6 as well as working with highly disaggregated trade data.
Secondly, we also consider preferences offered to the Caribbean Basin countries (CBTPA). And finally, we
control not only for exports to the EU but also exports to the rest of the world.
Nilsson (2005) and Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) who instead employ a gravity model do not find such strong
results for AGOA in their sample. It must however, be noted that these studies did not use the same product
groups and level of aggregation. Nilsson (2005) explored the effects on total exports while Di Rubbo and
Canali focussed on agri-products. Collier and Venables on the other hand, limited their analysis to apparel.
In summary, Nilsson (2005) and Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) did not find significant trade creating effects
for AGOA. EU trade policy was found to be more trade creating compared to AGOA.
Nilsson (2005) in a study of EU and USA trade policy for 158 developing countries apply a standard gravity
model in estimating the trade effects of their trade policies. Their results confirm a stronger trade creating
effect of EU policy compared to the USA trade policy. However, one drawback is that, the study did not
account for the zero exports in the model estimated 7. This is presented as a censoring problem in the econo-
metrics literature and can create significant biases in coefficient estimates thus making them unreliable for
inference (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Greene, 2003, Jensen et al., 2002, Wooldridge, 2002).
However, Nilsson’s (2005) cross section estimation using the 2001 - 2003 annual average exports reduce
the censoring problem. The coefficients of both sets of regressions are similar; however, the t-statistics
estimated in the 2001 – 2003 panel are twice the cross-section estimates indicating the potential bias of
ignoring the censoring of the dependent variable in his model. The reported trade creation values for the
cross-section regression 8 include EU imports-35.6%; low income countries-50.3%; lower middle income
countries-22.9% and upper middle income countries-46.2%. The percentages indicate the amount of trade
generated by EU trade policy compared to USA policy. Thus the 50.3% reported for low income countries
imply that EU policy created 50.3% more exports compared to USA policy for low income countries. All
but lower middle income countries had significant coefficients in the cross-section regression. The coeffi-
cients for the panel regression are not discussed in this section due to the potential bias in the coefficients
6We go beyond apparel products to include all six–digit products within the following categories: live animals; meat and edible
meat offal; salt, sulphur, earth and stone, plastering; ores, slag and ash; and textile products.
7Nilsson (2005) in Section 4, the last paragraph of the gravity model sub-section makes reference to the zero exports–”No particular
attempt is made to deal with the zero-or missing value observations in the trade data” The countries with zero or missing trade data
can be found in footnote 32.
8It is converted from actual EU imports from developing countries normalized by the transformed dummy coefficient of the relevant
dummy for EU imports, and various income groupings.
5identified above. Finally, the average estimate of gross creation by EU policy for the period 2001 – 2003
was 70.2%, 59.3% and 54.2% of total imports by the EU from developing countries for lower income, lower
middle and upper middle income countries respectively (Nilsson, 2005). This is an indication of the size of
the gross trade creation by the EU trade policy.
Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) in a study of 102 developing countries for the period 1996 - 2005 for agri-
cultural products (food and fibre products) use a similar methodology to that of Nilsson (2005). They find
EU trade policy to be more effective at creating trade than USA policy. They report gross trade creation
coefficients of 75.9%, 62.2%, 90.4% and 69.1% for low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle in-
come countries and EU imports respectively for the period 1996 - 2000. Higher percentages are recorded
for the period 2000 - 2005 of 80.8%, 63.1%, 91.4% and 73% for low income, lower-middle income, upper-
middle income countries and EU imports respectively. A similar interpretation to Nilsson’s can be given to
Di Rubbo and Canali–however, EU policy generates more exports of agri-products compared to the USA.
They find the trade variation to be significant for the lower income group. Compared to Nilsson (2005)
the trade creation effects are stronger for the upper-middle income countries rather than the low-income
countries. We note that, these effects are confined to the agri-food sector not total exports as was the case in
Nilsson. Also, the reported coefficients of Nilsson above, are for his cross-section regression and therefore
exclude the time variation provided by Di Rubbo and Canali (2008).
In similar fashion, a recent paper by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) estimates the impact of AGOA at
the HS 8 - digit level using standard difference-in-differences and triple difference-in-differences – control-
ling for baseline levels of imports, country and product specific import trends after the adoption of AGOA.
They find an increase of 42% of imports on average as a result of the AGOA preference. However, they
estimate the causal impact of AGOA to be lower at 28%—they argue that this controls for both the pre- and
post-import differences for both AGOA and non AGOA countries—as well as control for product-specific
trends common for both groups of countries. On the contrary, concentrating on only non-oil imports they
find the increase to be 6.6%.
In summarising, Collier and Venables (2007), Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), Gibbon (2003), Pa´ez
et al. (2010) generally find apparel and textiles as well as oil and energy products to be the main drivers
of the gains by AGOA beneficiaries. We do observe this also in our analysis and it is further discussed in
Section 5. Gibbon (2003) and Pa´ez et al. (2010) discuss the proliferation of firms in the textile industry and
the enormous impact on employment in that sector for Lesotho and other African countries. This according
to them is not limited to apparel but also to oil and energy related exports where the example provided
is the increase in investments in Nigeria’s energy sector. Nonetheless, for Lesotho in spite of the record
investments an impediment in having further investments was the constraints on land available (Gibbon,
2003). Had these constraints not existed a much stronger impact of AGOA might have ensued.
In an extended survey of previous empirical studies, Mold (2005) links the mild impact of AGOA to (1) the
limited benefits and exclusion of sensitive products from the AGOA list, (2) the initial 8-year life span of
AGOA with the subsequent extension in 2004 (of AGOA) to 2015 has not encouraged long-term investments
for investors who have been given a short horizon to work with, (3) the fear that preferential access and new
trade agreements under discussion if offered to the Middle East and Central America would dampen any
benefits offered by AGOA and (4) Arbitrary use of AGOA ROOs in certain products. An example offered
by Mold is the near-exclusion of Kenya due to its inability to meet ROOs in textiles. Mold (2005) brings to
the fore the impact of the AGOA conditions on freedom of policy making and the uncertainty created by the
6periodic (annual) review of AGOA beneficiaries.
2.2 CBI and Caribbean Basin Countries
The CBERA preferences were less effective than the CBTPA preferences (Hornbeck, 2010) and this shows
in the jump we observe in Figure (4(a)) in Appendix I. However, this is explained by Hutchinson and Schu-
macher (1994) to be as a result of (a) over-reliance on the market mechanism, (b) the exclusion of important
Caribbean Basin products such as textile and apparel as well as tourism products hindered the reaping of its
potential benefits, (c) the re-imposition and tightening of US sugar quotas and (d) the falling world prices of
petroleum and petroleum products. This has led many authors to conclude that CBERA preferences failed to
achieve their mandate of increasing economic growth in the region (for example, Ames, 1993, Hornbeck,
2010, Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994). Nonetheless, the CBTPA preferences which had a large impact
on the recipients also met with a decline as a result of the introduction of the CAFTA-DR (this is observed
as the declining trend for our selected Caribbean countries in Figure (4(a))).
Hornbeck (2010) argues that CBI beneficiaries have suffered from erosion of their preferences as a result
of the increasing move towards the adoption of free trade agreements (FTA) by the USA. NAFTA after its
adoption, curtailed the trade advantage of the CBI countries over Mexico—thereby giving Mexico some
advantages in apparel and other products Mexico was more competitive at producing than the Caribbean
Basin countries (Hornbeck, 2010, Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994). Hutchinson and Schumacher (1994)
in calculating the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of Mexico and the Caribbean countries in their
top 30 export products did find the Caribbean countries to be competitive in 20 out of their top 30 industries
and expected this to provide some buffer against NAFTA. The adoption of the CAFTA-DR has in particular
adversely affected the remaining Caribbean countries within the CBI and again reduced their trade advan-
tage in apparel and textiles and non-primary commodities (Hornbeck, 2010). The main reason provided
by Hornbeck (2010) is due to the cummulation rules in apparel production among NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and
Haiti which leave the remaining countries under the CBI with limited ability to adapt to the new competition
from these regions. The percent of apparel imports in total US imports of apparel is even lower–this fell
from 13.6% in 2005 to 1% in 2008 (Hornbeck, 2010). Hornbeck (2010) attributes this to the CAFTA-DR —
CAFTA-DR countries excluding Costa Rica accounted for 90% of total apparel imports of all the Caribbean
Basin countries (Hornbeck, 2010) and this accounts for the vast shortfall.
Hornbeck (2010) shows that only 7.5% of total imports from CBI recipient countries were eligible for
preferential tariffs after excluding CAFTA-DR and energy exporting countries. This is what might be driving
our negative coefficients discussed in section 4 of this paper. In addition, Hornbeck (2010) finds that the
following additional factors contributed to the diminishing preferences (a) CAFTA-DR countries produced
most of the apparel and textile products (b) the remaining CBI countries are not competitive in the apparel
sector and have been unable to take advantage of the preferences and (c) The removal of the multifibre
agreement (MFA) on textiles has furthered heightened their situation. It must however, be added that some
of this might also be due to AGOA countries such as Lesotho and Kenya (and other smaller AGOA recipients)
gaining a foothold in the US market.
72.3 Trends in Imports to the USA from Selected AGOA and CBI beneficiaries
The variation in the exports under the various programmes are shown in the graphs at the end of the paper in
Appendix I. Figures (2) and (3) show the relationship between the preferential exports and mean aggregate
exports (1997-1999) to the USA for AGOA and GSP. Figures (4) and (5) on the other hand, show the trends
in the share of preferential exports in aggregate preferences and total exports to the USA respectively. For
the GSP preference South Africa is the main outlier while Nigeria is the outlier for AGOA exports. Ex-
cluding these two countries in Figures (2(a)) and (3(c)) for those with exports greater than the mean total
exports for the period 1997-1999 ($35.37 million) improves the fit and the line becomes steeper (Angola
now becomes the outlier with exports close to $1 billion) to the USA.
There is no clear indication of the relationship for countries below the mean, however, rescaling the the
graph would show a very steep line of fit as in (3(c)) for these countries. In Figure (4), the selected CBI
countries within Latin America in (4(b)) do not show much difference between their shares. On the con-
trary, a clear jump in the share of exports for the selected AGOA countries in (5) is noticed in 2001 (countries
begin to use their AGOA preferences). Similarly, noticeable differences exist in (4(a)) with the prominent
case being the large jump in 2005 for Barbados but which gradually falls over time.
Figures (6) and (7) show the mean imports by applied and MFN tariffs for selected African and Caribbean
Basin countries at the 6 digit level. Figures (8) and (9) show the maximum imports into the USA within
each category. Ghana and Barbados are observed to export under each category. However, their mean im-
ports into the USA are far below US$1 million and that of the remaining countries (with the exception of
Angola that has mean imports into USA below US$ 20000). Kenya, Costa Rica and Jamaica have higher
means, however, these are concentrated in two dominant categories—apparel and textiles, and salt/ore, slag
and Ash exports. For the selected AGOA beneficiaries, their mean imports into the USA are dominated by
free imports. The same can be said of Barbados and Jamaica. Although Ghana had low mean imports into
the USA of apparel, the maximum imports into the USA from Ghana are concentrated in apparel and the
imports are above US$ 6 million. For the remaining countries the pattern in the mean category is maintained.
Finally, Figure (10) shows the competitiveness of selected AGOA and CBI beneficiaries in four sectors,
animals/meat, apparel, salt/ores and textiles. For both panels of the graph, the mean competitiveness prior
to the adoption of AGOA (1996 - 2000) and post AGOA (2001 - 2009) are compared. In Panel (a), apart
from South Africa the remaining countries—Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria show increased competitiveness
in textiles in the post-AGOA period. South Africa on the other hand, has increased its competitiveness in
salt/ores. This is similarly shown for selected CBI countries using the pre– and post–AGOA periods for
comparative purposes. The selected CBI countries in Panel (b) show a decline in their competitiveness in
the apparel and textiles sector post–AGOA. However, Honduras and Jamaica have seen an increase in their
competitiveness within the salt/ore sector while Costa Rica has experienced a marginal improvement in the
animals/meat sector.
83 Data and Methods
Data for the analysis is obtained from the World Integrated System9 (WITS) which queries data from UN
Comtrade for export (and import) data and UN TRAINS for the tariff data. Gross domestic product data is
obtained from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators10 (WDI) and gravity type variables (viz.,
landlocked, area, latitude, number of cities, official language, etc) are obtained from the CEPII distances
database11. In addition, our political variables (military and religion) are obtained from the Database of
Political Institutions12 (DPI) and democracy time series dataset 13. Finally, the preferential dummies are
constructed based on information sourced from the WITS preferential database and USITC14 The remain-
ing variables constructed (viz., RCA and market size) are based on the variables obtained from the sources
above. Table (1) provides further information on the variables used as well as summary statistics.
We selected HS 2-digit categories 01:- Live Animals, 02:- Meat and edible meat offal; 25:- Salt, sulphur,
earth & stone, plastering, etc; 26:- Ores, slag and ash; and 50–63:- Apparel and clothing and then used all
the 6-digit categories within these 2-digit choices. The products were selected based on whether some of
the 6-digit products were captured in the preference. Also, of interest were products that form a signifi-
cant component of developing country exports. Apparel and Textiles are an important component of both
AGOA and CBTPA preferences hence their inclusion. Arguably, agricultural produce and energy and energy
related products are important in the exports of some of the beneficiary countries, however, we excluded
these products from our analysis given that majority of the countries offered these preferences are net oil
importers. Secondly, energy products form a significant component of AGOA exports to the USA—we
therefore seek to carry out the analysis excluding these products to see if a positive impact is still observed.
We use annual data covering the period 1996 – 2009. There are 166 countries and 981 different products
at the 6 digit level in the dataset. The products comprise of 808 apparel and textile and 173 non apparel
and textile products at the 6-digits level. Fewer products are however, exported by several of the countries.
For example, for the African countries fewer than 400 products are exported in any given year. Of these
products there are some products that are not exported in all years. In Table (1), the probability of exporting
a particular 6-digit product in our sample is 0.342, the average number of free lines per 6-digit category is
0.444, the average weighted MFN tariff is 9.03% and the average applied tariff is 8.09%. The probability of
exporting under the GSP, AGOA, CAFTA-DR and CBTPA are 0.008, 0.004, 0.01 and 0.007 respectively. The
tariff margins are constructed based on information provided at the 6-digit level on the MFN and applied
tariff provided by WITS. In cases where missing values are encountered we checked the preferential status
of the country and replaced the missing values with the average estimate based on the region, preference
group and product. Exports not provided by UN Comtrade were assumed to be zero. This holds since for
developing countries we use mirror exports (that is, the USA and World import values from these countries)
in place of the actual export values. By doing this, we are able to observe whether they actually exported
those products. Nonetheless, the mirror export values are better recorded than the export values from the
developing countries (Piermartini and Teh, 2005).
9http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
10http://data.worldbank.org/
11Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
12Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. ”New tools in comparative political
economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
13Norris, 2009, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Democracy%20TimeSeries%20Data/
14http://dataweb.usitc.gov/
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Finally, it is acknowledged that the tariff margin variable might be measured with some error given the
paucity of tariff data available on UN TRAINS. We do, however, believe that this would not seriously affect
our estimates presented in the results section. As a result, the tariff margin is not used in all regressions—in
its place, we allow the country-product fixed effects to capture the tariff margin. Doing this makes it possi-
ble to check if the coefficients are biased in the absence of the tariff margin as an additional regressor.
The econometric formulation for investigating trade preferences at the macro level is adopted from Collier
and Venables’s (2007) paper. They estimate the impact of the USA’s AGOA and EU trade preferences (given
by dummies) on the log of exports from developing countries to the USA relative to the EU-15 countries.
They control for market size and market demand shocks. We depart from Collier and Venables (2007) by
looking at disaggregated 6 digit HS chapters 1, 2, 25, 26 and 50-6315 and instead use the ratio of imports
by the USA relative to imports by rest of the world for each country (see equation 4). Additional controls
included here are each countries RCA, lagged values of applied preferential and MFN tariffs (or preference
margins) at the 6-digit product level and lagged political controls such as democracy and political stability.
In addition, imports under the GSP is controlled for by interacting our GSP dummy with the CBI and AGOA
dummies.
At the 6 digit level of disaggregation, zero exports would be observed for some countries hence the Heck-
man two-stage panel estimator is more appropriate in modelling Equation (5). This is needed to correct for
selectivity bias in the decision to export a particular HS 6 digit product in the case of the Heckman selec-
tion. Essentially, there is self-selection in the exports of products at highly disaggregated levels, whereby
countries do not randomly choose to export a particular product. Our panel approach to estimation allows
us to include fixed effects (exporter and product fixed effects) and time effects to control for some of the
unobserved characteristics and market shocks respectively. The principal model is the Heckman selection
— the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PPMLE), panel fixed effects, and Mundlak corrected
random effects models are included for comparative purposes.
Equation (1) and (2) below model exports from country i (partner) to j (USA) and rest of the world as a
function of exporter nation characteristics (E), USA and World characteristics - captured by market size
(M ), between country characteristics (d) and an error term (µ). The total imports by the USA relative to the
World of product p from all countries is the proxy for market size–which additionally controls for market
demand shocks in these importing regions. The between country characteristics (d) includes fixed elements-
for example distance and constant trade preferences over time as well as time varying country-pair specific
trade preferences (Collier and Venables, 2007, 1338-9). We proxy these using exporter and product fixed
effects for the constant parts and dummies for trade preferences for the time varying parts. Equation (3) is
then the ratio of the first two equations–this substitutes out the exporter characteristics leaving us with an
estimable equation in the form of Equation (5). Equation (4) is our selection equation and the Inverse Mills
Ratio calculated from (4) is incorporated into (5) to complete the Heckman two-step procedure.
The PPMLE is estimated using Equation (3) in its multiplicative form. The Poisson regression log linearises
this equation and thus our results would be similar to the log linearised model in Equation (5) (for example,
Herrera, 2010, Silva and Tenreyro, 2003). Our argument is that a country given a preference would then
decide which products to produce. In this decision, rules of origin, cummulation rules, preference margins,
competitiveness and other factors determine whether the country exports to the USA. In modelling the sec-
151–Live animals; 2–Meat and edible meat offal; 25–Salt, sulphur; earth & stone; plastering, etc; 26–Ores, slag and ash; 50-60–
Textiles; and 61-63–Textile articles (apparel and clothing).
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ond stage we do not believe that, the preference margin then plays a significant role since this is captured in
the product exported under the preference. Hence our exclusion restriction includes the preference margin
and this is discussed further in the next section.
Xip,j = Ei(t) ∗Mj(t) ∗ dip,j(t) ∗ µip,j(t) (1)
Xip,w = Ei(t) ∗Mw(t) ∗ dip,w(t) ∗ µip,w(t) (2)
xipt = Mt ∗ dipt ∗ µipt (3)
exportsipt = α+ β
′TPit + γ1lat+ γ2RCA
i,w
ipt + γ3Milipt−1
γ4tariff marginipt−1 + Γ′Za + ηip + ηt + µipt (4)
exportsipt =
{
1 if positive exports
0 otherwise
lnxipt = a+ α
′TPipt + γ1MSizept + γ2RCA
i,w
ipt−1 +
+λˆipt + δ
′Zb + ηip + ηt + ipt. (5)
Where: xipt =
Xip,j
Xip,w
;Mt =
Mj
Mw
; dipt =
dip,j
dip,w
i, p, and t subscripts refer to country, product and time respectively, j refers to the USA while w refers to rest of the world, “a” in Equation (5)
is the constant of the regression. The log of the dependent variable is taken as ln(1 + X). Tariffs and political variables are lagged in order to avoid
introducing any simultaneity or endogeneity into our model.
Xij is Imports from partner i
Ei is exporter nation characteristics
Mj is importer characteristics
dij is between country characteristics - given by trade preferences offered by j to i
µipt; ipt is an error term
TPit is trade preferences offered by the USA. It takes the value 1 from the year in which a country first receives
the preference and 0 before16. Includes, GSP, AGOA and CBI beneficiaries
TPipt is trade preferences offered by the USA. It takes the value 1 for a product exported under a preference and
0 otherwise17. Includes, GSP, AGOA and CBTPA beneficiaries for each product
MSizept is market size the ratio of total imports of our selected commodities into j excluding country i.
tariff marginipt calculated as
MFN tariff−Applied HS tariff
MFN tariff for each country, year and product.
Mil is Military - 1 if chief executive is a serving military officer
λˆipt Is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage regression, calculated as:
φ(·)
Φ(·) ,
where φ(·) is the standard normal probability density function and Φ(·) is the standard normal density
function of the Equation (4) whenE(exports = 1| covariates).
ηt Time effects
ηip exporter and product fixed effects in the fixed effects regression. Is the random effects in the panel random
effect models
Za vector of control variables – latitude, natural log of area, number of cities, Number of Free lines, dummies
for Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, landlocked Christians, Muslims, English and Spanish speaking
countries
Zb vector of control variables – latitude, natural log of area, number of cities, dummies for landlocked, Africa,
Latin America & Caribbean, NAFTA, CAFTA, English and Spanish speaking countries
RCA Based on Balassa (1967)18the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is calculated as:
RCAi,w
ipt
=
(
Xw
p,i∑
p
Xw
p,i
)
÷
(
Xwp,w∑
p
Xwp,w
)
where: Xwp,i is exports of product p from country i to the World and
∑
p
Xwp,i is total exports from
country i to World,Xwp,w and
∑
p
Xwp,w are the world exports of product p and total exports respectively
16Definition allows preferences to overlap for each country. Thus a country can be an AGOA and a GSP beneficiary. To control for
these overlaps we include interaction terms for those cases where countries have two or more preferences
17Previous footnote applies here also
18Balassa, Bela 1967, Studies in Trade Liberalization, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore: Maryland
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4 Econometric Modelling Issues
We attempt various econometric techniques viz., the Heckman selection and the Poisson models. These are
then compared to traditional estimates from the fixed effects and random effects models based on positive
export flows. We employ the fixed effects regressions in most of our estimations as this approach allows
for the existence of a correlation between the fixed effects and the regressors (Baltagi, 2001, Greene, 2003,
Wooldridge, 2002). Secondly, the fixed effects approach minimises the omitted variable problem as the
fixed effects capture variables omitted from the model leaving the coefficients unbiased to a large extent.
A problem with the fixed effects is the inability to estimate time invariant variables. However, the time
invariant variables can be recovered from a regression of the variables on the extracted fixed effects. The
time invariant variables are not pivotal to our analysis so this is pursued only in a couple of regressions for
comparison purposes—that is to compare the coefficients to those of the random effects, which allows for
time invariant variables.
Unlike the fixed effects, the random effects approach does not allow for a correlation between the random
effects and the explanatory variables. The model assumes this correlation to be zero. Hence, in the presence
of a correlation, the random effects model becomes inconsistent and inefficient. Additionally, Mundlak
(1978) argues that the random effects model in the presence of the correlation is misspecified. Mundlak
(1978) argues that the random effects model is biased when there is a correlation between the random
effects and the explanatory variables. To overcome this, Mundlak (1978) suggests adding the mean of the
explanatory variables as additional regressors in the random effects model. Thus in our case the ηip in
Equation (4) and (5) (when estimated by random effects can be assumed to be capturing the random effects)
can be specified as:
ηip = ϕ
′X¯ip + ϑip (6)
where:
ϑip ∼ N(0, σ2ϑ), X¯ip =
∑T
t=1
Xipt
T and X is the vector of explanatory variables in Equation (4) or (5)
This is pursued for all the random effects models presented in the results section. The Hausman test allows
a choice to be made between the fixed effects and the random effects models. In addition, the Breusch and
Pagan test provides a way of testing whether the random effects are significant. In Table (2) we report the
Breusch and Pagan test and these are significant for all random effects models estimated (with and without
Mundlak’s correction). The Hausman test is not pursued since we employ the fixed effects model to capture
country and product specific effects that are not captured by the variables included in our model. The fixed
effects are significantly different from zero in all estimations as provided in the table’s footnotes.
We now turn to specific econometric modelling issues found in the trade literature that requires our attention
in this paper—as well as revisit some of the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs. The Heckman se-
lection and Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPMLE) have become dominant techniques in empirical
trade studies (for example, Helpman et al., 2007, Herrera, 2010, Silva and Tenreyro, 2003, 2006, 2009,
Silva et al., 2010). Given the presence of zeros in the trade data and the large literature on selection into
exporting we pursue the Heckman selection as one of our models. In light of the zeros we also pursue the
13
PPMLE. The Heckman selection is motivated by the desire to model the self-selection into export markets
(for example, Agostino et al., 2007, Cardamone, 2007).
It was earlier mentioned that, mirror exports are used to help reduce the missing or unrecorded exports of
developing countries. The missing data problem is not entirely resolved as this is symptomatic of highly
disaggregated trade data. However, we are reassured of the reliability of the import data since import data
tend to be more accurately recorded compared to export data (for example, Piermartini and Teh, 2005).
This is the case since tariffs have to be applied to imports at the border. Thus, in our case, imports into the
USA would be more reliable since the USA has to decide which imports are allowed in duty free, under
the various preferences, MFN or at normal tariff rates—this makes them more reliable. One can safely
conclude that most of the remaining missing or unrecorded values in the dataset represent countries not
exporting that particular product. This essentially motivates the Heckman’s two stage panel estimator to
control for self-selection into export markets and thus reduce the problem of selection bias that arises.
Import data includes cost insurance and freight charges. This is absent in export data that is reported free
on board (Piermartini and Teh, 2005). In addition, this creates an estimation problem due to the correlation
between imports and the error term as a result of transport costs (Piermartini and Teh, 2005). We do not
expect this to pose any problems since we take the log ratio of mirror exports from developing countries to
the rest of the world as the dependent variable. The use of this ratio cancels the transport costs and some
constant characteristics of the exporters from the model.
An issue prevalent in pursuing Heckman’s selection model is finding appropriate exclusion restrictions. The
use of appropriate exclusion restrictions reduces the bias in standard errors calculated at the second stage
and allows the model to be identified (Bushway et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the use of a probit in the first
stage without the necessary exclusion restrictions holds as the non linear nature of the probit model pro-
vides identification (Zabel, 1992). In circumstances where both the first stage and the second stage are non
linear (or linear if the first stage is based on a linear probability model) then the exclusion restrictions are
important in identifying the second stage (Zabel, 1992). More importantly, failure to find adequate exclu-
sion restrictions implies that the second stage cannot be identified in this case and estimates of the second
stage would be inconsistent and inefficient (Zabel, 1992). To overcome these issues we adopt Jensen et al.’s
(2002) approach of estimating a Mundlak corrected random effects probit model in the first stage and a
fixed effects model in the second stage. This reduces the problem of having omitted variables in the first
stage as well as mis-specifying the model. The challenge in carrying out the first stage probit model in
our case is getting the model to converge—especially for the disaggregated product regressions. If faced
with this problem we can safely adopt a linear fixed effects or a Mundlak corrected linear random effects
estimator for the first stage. This, then requires us to include valid restrictions in our first stage to aid the
identification of our second stage regressions.
Helpman et al. (2007) adopted religion as their exclusion restriction in modelling firm heterogeneity within
the gravity framework. However, this has been criticised by some authors (for example, Silva and Tenreyro,
2009) who do not find a link between religion and the probability of exporting. We instead use the tariff
margin, military and preference dummies created at the country level (not product level and irrespective of
whether the country uses the preference). Our argument is that, a country given a preference would then
decide which products to export. This decision would be influenced by rules of origin, cumulation rules,
preference margins and competitiveness at the product level as well as other factors that determine whether
the country exports to the USA (viz., autocracy, number of free lines, landlocked among others). In the sec-
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ond stage, the tariff margin serves as an exclusion restriction. After a country has decided on exporting, the
tariff margin then has a lesser emphasis in encouraging exports since other factors such as competitiveness
and capacity of the country becme more important. In our analysis, the tariff margin would be captured
by the product dummies19 at the second stage and in the other regressions as well as the country-product
fixed effects. The dummy-time interactions in later regressions capture annual variations and modifications
occurring within the preference programmes.
The PPMLE has been shown to provide consistent results for gravity models and in our case it would also
yield consistent estimates. The zero inflated poisson (ZIP) model can be an alternative to the PPMLE since
it models excess zeros through a logit and hence solves any headaches with selection20. However, this is not
pursued due to estimation problems encountered—due to the large number of parameters (mainly the fixed
effects) the model is unable to converge. Another model within the pseudo maximum likelihood family,
the negative binomial regression (NBREG) is also a useful alternative in the presence of over-dispersion in
the dependent variable. However, the NBREG is sensitive to the scaling of the dependent variable and is
restrictive. It does not do well in the presence of excess zeros, thus it is not pursued here. Bosquet and
Boulhol (2010) show that the NBREG PMLE is not consistent and is sensitive to the scale of the dependent
variable—thus not good for modelling trade flows. On the contrary, the PPMLE is consistent as long as
the conditional mean function is correctly specified (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). As a result the PPMLE
can be applied to data generating processes for the dependent variable in cases where it is not poisson dis-
tributed (ibid.).
Finally, Piermartini and Teh (2005) argue that GDP is unreliable in estimations using disaggregated data
and that the right controls in such cases is output data for the exporting industry or sectoral-country specific
effects. In this paper, product-country effects are included in all fixed effects estimations and an additional
variable, the revealed comparative advantage for each country is included to capture its competitiveness at
the product level. This hopefully, solves the problem and reduces any omitted variables problem from not
controlling explicitly for sectoral output.
5 Results and Discussion
The results in this section focus on the HS-6 digit level of disaggregation. All regressions apart from the
regression of time invariant characteristics on the fixed effects in Table (4), include country-product and
time fixed effects. All regressions with the exception of the random effects probit and the Poisson PMLE
fixed effects estimates report robust standard errors clustered around the country-product groups. Table
(2) reports three different estimators—the fixed, Mundlak corrected random effects and the ordinary panel
random effects estimators. Table (3) reports the Heckman two-step estimator and the Poisson PMLE. This
allows allows a comparison of the various estimators and also to show any indication of bias in our chosen
Heckman model. Table (4) presents the time invariant variables regressed on the extracted fixed effects
reported in the first four columns of Table (2) and the Heckman second stage estimations in Table (3). Fi-
nally, Table (5) allows us to check the sensitivity of our estimates to the exclusion of OECD and European
countries as well as China and Hong Kong from our regressions. In Appendix II, more results are presented
showing estimates of other levels of disaggregation (HS2 and HS4)—to show whether our estimates are
sensitive to the level of disaggregation. Additionally, the tables in the appendix also compare estimates of
non apparel and textiles to those of apparel and textiles to confirm whether the USA preferences are being
19The dummies are defined at the product and indicate products that are processed under the preference and exported as such.
20Thanks to Barry Reilly for pointing this out
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driven by apparel and textiles.
We next discuss the results in the main paper. Columns (1) - (4) of Table (2) reports estimates from the fixed
effects regression. The difference between columns (1) and (2) is the inclusion of the military variable in
column (2). Columns (3) and (4) augment Columns (1) and (2) respectively with the interaction of AGOA
and CBTPA preferences with year dummies respectively. The base year for the AGOA-year interaction is
2001 and that for the CBTPA-year interaction is 2000. Thus these two interaction terms are dropped from
the regression and become the reference categories in interpreting the remaining preference-year interac-
tions in the regression. Columns (5) - (8) reports the Mundlak corrected random effects—these follow the
same pattern as columns (1) - (4). The main difference is the incorporation of time invariant variables. Thus
in column (6) and (8) dummies for Christians and Muslims (base category is other religions) are included
in addition to military. The inclusion of military and the religious dummies in these models allows us to
test whether they can be omitted from the model and used as valid exclusion restrictions for the Heckman
two-step estimator. We can reject the alternate hypothesis that the military coefficient is different from zero
at the 5% level of significance in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)—thereby indicating that it is not correlated
with the dependent variable in the second stage. We cannot do the same for the religious dummies which are
significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level and thus correlated with our dependent variable. Hence,
if used in the Heckman first stage as an exclusion restriction, the residuals might be correlated with the
second stage error. The Muslim dummy is however, not significant at conventional levels in columns (4)
and (8) of Table (4) when regressed on the fixed effects. The final two columns of Table (2) reports the
ordinary random effects estimator.
The AGOA, CBTPA and GSP preferences are significant in all eight columns of Table (2). Our controls
CAFTA-DR, the lag of each country’s RCA and market size of the USA are also significant in all columns.
The interaction of GSP and AGOA is not significant in any of the columns of the table. The interaction
of CBTPA and GSP is however, significant in our random effects type models. With the exception of the
English speaking dummy all other time invariant controls included in the random effects type models are
significantly different from zero. NAFTA has a coefficient of 1.7 in the Mundlak corrected random effects
models indicating that NAFTA increases exports to the USA relative to the world by 447.39% compared to
non NAFTA countries. Similarly, Latin American and Caribbean countries on average and holding all things
constant significantly increase exports to the USA relative to the world. These are expected given the close
proximity of NAFTA countries and to a large extent the Latin American and Caribbean countries to the USA.
On the contrary, on average and holding all else constant, African exports to the USA are significantly lower
relative to the rest of the world in the Mundlak regressions but positive in columns (9) and (10). In sum-
marising, Table (2) indicates that AGOA and GSP preferences increase exports to the USA relative to the rest
of the world holding all else constant. While CAFTA-DR decreases exports to the USA relative to the world.
For the CBTPA preferences, a positive coefficient is achieved only after controlling for annual variations in
preferences through the inclusion of preferences and time interactions. In the case of AGOA, controlling
for the annual variation in the preferences makes no difference to the sign or significance of the estimated
coefficient. Also, the interaction of time and preferences is significantly lower in 2008 and 2009 compared
to the base years of AGOA (2001) and CBTPA (2000). An indication of the harm caused to exports of de-
veloping countries and the ability of the USA to absorb additional imports from the world as a result of the
financial crisis of that period. In spite of this, the AGOA and CBTPA preferences on average and holding
all things constant have been able to increase exports of developing countries to the USA relative to their
exports to the rest of the world.
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Turning our attention to the next table (Table (3)) we find qualitatively similar results. AGOA is positive and
significant in both the Heckman model and the Poisson PMLE. Similarly, the CBTPA preferences are only
positive when the annual variation to the preference is controlled for. On the contrary, the GSP becomes
negative in the Poisson models. They are however, significant in all models in which they appear within
the table. In both tables the annual variation of the AGOA preferences indicates that the first few year of
AGOA saw a rapid rise in exports to the USA relative to the rest of the world compared to the base year
of 2001. Columns (1) and (4) report the first stage results for our Heckman model. All variables with the
exception of the number of free lines have a significant impact on the probability of exporting to the USA.
Apart from countries that qualify for the CBI, all the remaining preferences, that is, GSP and AGOA eligible
countries significantly lower the probability of exporting to the USA. A country’s competitiveness (RCA)
in a product and the tariff margin significantly increases their probability of exporting to the USA. This
is in line with our earlier assertion in the preceding section that, the larger the margin between the MFN
tariff and the applied tariff (in this case the preferential tariff) the more likely a country would try to exploit
the gains from exporting that particular product. Nonetheless to exploit these advantages a country with a
competitive advantage in production of product p is more likely to benefit from the higher tariff margins by
increasing its exports.
In column (4), latitude, English and Spanish speaking as well as land area significantly increase the probabil-
ity of exporting to the USA holding all else constant. The remaining variables, number of cities, landlocked,
Christianity and Muslim dummies (compared to the other religions) reduce the probability of exporting to
the USA. The negative coefficients for the Muslim and Christian dummies might largely be due to the Chi-
nese effect. However, for the Muslim dummy the composition of the exports of Muslim countries is also
playing a role here. The military coefficient significantly lowers the probability of exporting to the USA.
This is evidenced in the fact that, the USA normally imposes trade sanctions on countries it believes to be
undemocratic or ruled by military leaders. The significance of military and the religious dummies indicate
that they must be included in the first stage regression. They are thus highly correlated with the probability
of exporting to the USA. In addition, all exclusion restrictions are jointly significantly different from zero.
The case for military is however, much stronger than the religious dummies. The main difference between
the two first stage regressions is that column (1) is based on a fixed effects regression, while column (4) is
a Mundlak corrected random effects estimator—modified from that proposed by Jensen et al. (2002). Col-
umn (4) allows additional exclusion restrictions in the form of the religious dummies as well as additional
controls provided by the time invariant variables.
In the second stage, we include the time and preference interactions in the immediate column after each
first stage regression. The second column after the first stage estimates (columns (3) and (6)) exclude these
interactions. The time-preference interactions only make a difference for the CBTPA in this table as previ-
ously shown in Table (2). The last two columns report the coefficients for the Poisson PMLE model. The
coefficients for the Poisson model in most cases are larger than the previous models discussed. However,
the Poisson model’s standard errors are lowest among all the models reported above. In most cases it is
less than half the standard error of the other models—thus indicating that it provides the lowest variance
among the estimators presented in this section. The standard errors of the Heckman model are quite similar
to those of the fixed effects model in Table (2). This in turn indicates that our exclusion restrictions are
reasonable. The Heckman second stage standard errors reported in Table (3) have not been corrected as
has been suggested by for example Wooldridge (2002). The similar standard errors reported by both model
types reduces the pressure of correcting the second stage errors reported and also leads us to believe that
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the standard errors are unbiased. This result can be attributed to the large sample dimension of our data and
given that our estimators have large N and small T sample properties we can overlook the correction at this
stage.
Given these comparisons, all models presented with the exception of the ordinary random effects estimator
are consistent to a large extent. The ordinary random effects model however, has presented us with rela-
tively larger coefficients—at times twice the estimated coefficients in the other models. This points to its
inconsistency and inefficiency, hence the other models perform better in reducing this bias. An argument
which we do not find tenable here is whether the model is misspecified and that the random effects model
is inappropriate. It does not seem so, since the Mundlak corrected random effects attenuates the bias of
the ordinary random effects. The explanation could be the presence of a correlation between the random
effects and some explanatory variables. Thus the inclusion of the averages of the explanatory variables
as suggested by Mundlak (1978) has greatly reduced the misspecification and problems created by the as-
sumption of no correlation. Nevertheless, the ρ reported by the random effects type models is significantly
different from zero indicating that the random effects model is preferred to a pooled OLS regression. In
addition, the Breusch and Pagan LM tests of random effects indicate the presence of the random effects
and these are significantly different from zero. Finally, the goodness of fit measures of the Mundlak cor-
rected random effects are larger than those of the ordinary random and fixed effects models. As a result, the
Mundlak random effects model provides a better fit and is the more appropriate model to present.
Table (4) shows the median and OLS regression of the time invariant variables on the fixed effects. Apart
from the NAFTA coefficient the median regressions report lower coefficients compared to the OLS regres-
sion. In almost all cases there are no sign reversals. Comparing the coefficients to that of the Mundlak
corrected random effects model, it is observed that Spanish speaking, English speaking and African dum-
mies are now positive in the fixed effects models. The NAFTA coefficient is smaller than that reported
in Table (2). The first eight columns of Table (4) correspond to the first four columns of Table (2). The
remaining four columns correspond to the Heckman second stage regression in Table (3). To sum up, the
remaining coefficients have the same sign as the random effects models but are marginally larger in most
cases.
The final table reports results for a sub-sample of countries. In columns (1), (3) and (4) we exclude OECD
and European countries from our sample leaving us with 119 countries. In columns (2), (5) and (6) China
and Hong Kong are also excluded in addition to the countries excluded earlier. These provide us with fur-
ther sensitivity and robustness checks. In addition, we want to show whether in the absence of China (which
is competitive in similar products) the AGOA and CBTPA preferences show larger and more significant co-
efficients. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported earlier. The only difference is in the first
stage regression, the GSP eligible country dummy is now positive. Indicating that in the presence of the
more competitive OECD countries and China, there is a marginally higher probability of exporting under
the GSP.
In order to make the comparison across the models we summarise the coefficients and the exponentiated co-
efficients of the dummies of the models in Figure (1). The minimum and maximum coefficients are reported
for each model and for the AGOA, GSP, CBTPA and CAFTA-DR preferences. The noticeable difference is
the ordinary random effects and the Poisson model coefficients. The remaining models have quite similar
coefficients. The graph on the right side (panel b) reports the exponentiated coefficients of the non Poisson
models. We do this since our dependent variable is in logs and the explanatory variable is a dummy. We
18
thus report the percentage impact of the preferences. The analysis above points towards the tendency of the
USA preferences in increasing the exports of its preference beneficiaries relative to their exports to the rest
of the world. Various attempts at testing the robustness and sensitivity of the estimates also lend support to
the conclusion above. Thus, the maximum impact of AGOA, GSP, and CBTPA is 57.8%, 13.4%, and 48.4%
respectively ignoring the results from the ordinary random effects model. Similarly, the minimum impact is
38.3%, 11.5% and -48.8% respectively. The CAFTA-DR impact is negative in all models—the magnitude
of the impact is 40.3% in absolute terms. On the whole, these are much smaller than Collier and Venables
(2007) but quite close to Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010). A comparison in this case is quite difficult
since Collier and Venables (2007) uses more aggregated data while Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) uses
data at the HS-8 level but for all products.
19
Ta
bl
e
2:
Fi
xe
d/
R
an
do
m
ef
fe
ct
s
re
gr
es
si
on
w
ith
ou
ts
el
ec
tio
n
co
rr
ec
tio
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
FE
1
FE
2
FE
3
FE
4
M
un
dl
ak
1
M
un
dl
ak
2
M
un
dl
ak
3
M
un
dl
ak
4
R
E
1
R
E
2
A
G
O
A
pr
od
uc
td
um
m
y
0.
32
4∗
∗∗
0.
32
4∗
∗∗
0.
38
4∗
∗
0.
38
5∗
∗
0.
45
6∗
∗∗
0.
45
6∗
∗∗
0.
41
7∗
∗
0.
41
7∗
∗
0.
81
8∗
∗∗
0.
82
5∗
∗∗
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
40
)
ag
oa
×
gs
p
pr
od
uc
td
um
m
y
0.
39
8
0.
39
7
0.
42
9
0.
42
8
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
14
0.
02
5
0.
02
4
-0
.0
74
-0
.0
72
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
77
)
(0
.4
78
)
(0
.5
23
)
(0
.5
23
)
(0
.5
65
)
(0
.5
65
)
(0
.5
39
)
(0
.5
41
)
C
B
T
PA
pr
od
uc
td
um
m
y
-0
.6
70
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
70
∗∗
∗
0.
36
7∗
∗
0.
36
8∗
∗
-0
.6
53
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
53
∗∗
∗
0.
39
4∗
∗∗
0.
39
5∗
∗∗
1.
21
8∗
∗∗
1.
21
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
11
)
cb
tp
a×
gs
p
pr
od
uc
td
um
m
y
-1
.0
98
-1
.0
98
-1
.1
15
-1
.1
15
-1
.5
48
∗
-1
.5
48
∗
-1
.5
59
∗
-1
.5
59
∗
-1
.2
19
∗
-1
.2
18
∗
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.6
17
)
(0
.6
17
)
(0
.6
17
)
(0
.6
17
)
(0
.6
00
)
(0
.6
00
)
G
SP
pr
od
uc
td
um
m
y
0.
11
3∗
∗
0.
11
3∗
∗
0.
11
3∗
∗
0.
11
3∗
∗
0.
12
5∗
∗
0.
12
5∗
∗
0.
12
6∗
∗
0.
12
6∗
∗
0.
18
0∗
∗∗
0.
17
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
34
)
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
-0
.5
05
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
05
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
42
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
43
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
83
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
83
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
22
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
22
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
41
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
45
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
33
)
C
ou
nt
ry
’s
R
C
A
,l
ag
ge
d
(l
og
)
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
0.
10
0∗
∗∗
0.
10
0∗
∗∗
0.
11
4∗
∗∗
0.
11
4∗
∗∗
0.
10
8∗
∗∗
0.
10
9∗
∗∗
0.
11
7∗
∗∗
0.
11
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
M
ar
ke
ts
iz
e,
U
SA
.W
or
ld
(l
og
s)
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
9∗
∗∗
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
02
9∗
∗∗
0.
02
9∗
∗∗
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
M
ili
ta
ry
-0
.0
18
+
-0
.0
20
+
-0
.0
18
+
-0
.0
20
+
-0
.0
47
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
07
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
02
0.
32
8+
0.
32
7+
0.
33
5+
0.
33
4+
0.
31
8+
0.
31
5+
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
03
0.
63
6∗
∗∗
0.
63
5∗
∗∗
0.
71
1∗
∗∗
0.
71
0∗
∗∗
0.
69
1∗
∗∗
0.
68
8∗
∗∗
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.1
73
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
04
0.
19
5
0.
19
4
0.
30
6+
0.
30
5+
0.
27
5
0.
27
4
(0
.1
65
)
(0
.1
65
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
69
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
05
0.
23
2
0.
23
1
0.
36
8∗
0.
36
7∗
0.
33
8+
0.
33
6+
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
80
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
06
-0
.2
70
-0
.2
72
-0
.1
40
-0
.1
42
-0
.1
77
-0
.1
81
(0
.1
70
)
(0
.1
70
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.1
72
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
07
-0
.2
82
+
-0
.2
83
+
-0
.1
41
-0
.1
43
-0
.1
70
-0
.1
73
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
08
-0
.5
79
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
80
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
50
∗∗
-0
.4
52
∗∗
-0
.4
72
∗∗
-0
.4
75
∗∗
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
67
)
ag
oa
×
ye
ar
20
09
-0
.7
27
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
28
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
16
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
18
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
36
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
39
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
75
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
01
0.
02
7
0.
02
7
0.
03
5
0.
03
5
0.
03
2
0.
03
2
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.1
25
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
02
-0
.3
98
∗∗
-0
.3
99
∗∗
-0
.3
91
∗∗
-0
.3
91
∗∗
-0
.4
04
∗∗
-0
.4
04
∗∗
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
03
-0
.7
56
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
56
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
44
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
44
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
54
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
54
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
32
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
04
-1
.1
07
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
07
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
10
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
10
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
02
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
02
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
05
-1
.5
03
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
04
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
05
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
05
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
98
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
98
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
34
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
06
-1
.6
57
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
58
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
76
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
76
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
36
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
34
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
40
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
07
-1
.8
41
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
41
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
61
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
61
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
20
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
18
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
08
-1
.9
41
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
41
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
82
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
82
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
21
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
19
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
34
)
cb
tp
a×
ye
ar
20
09
-2
.0
71
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
72
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
15
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
15
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
64
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
62
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
36
)
la
nd
lo
ck
ed
0.
07
8∗
∗∗
0.
07
8∗
∗∗
0.
07
8∗
∗∗
0.
07
8∗
∗∗
0.
06
0∗
∗∗
0.
06
4∗
∗∗
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
A
re
a
(l
og
)
-0
.0
18
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
18
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
18
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
18
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
33
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
36
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
N
um
be
ro
fc
iti
es
-0
.0
02
∗∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
0.
00
1+
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
la
tit
ud
e
-0
.0
02
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
02
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
E
ng
lis
h
Sp
ea
ki
ng
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
05
0.
02
5∗
∗
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
10
)
Sp
an
is
h
sp
ea
ki
ng
-0
.1
26
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
26
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
25
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
25
∗∗
∗
0.
08
1∗
∗∗
0.
11
2∗
∗∗
20
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
20
)
A
fr
ic
a
-0
.0
50
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
50
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
50
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
50
∗∗
∗
0.
06
8∗
∗∗
0.
05
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
&
C
ar
ib
be
an
0.
31
7∗
∗∗
0.
31
7∗
∗∗
0.
31
5∗
∗∗
0.
31
5∗
∗∗
0.
43
7∗
∗∗
0.
47
9∗
∗∗
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
20
)
N
A
FT
A
1.
69
9∗
∗∗
1.
69
9∗
∗∗
1.
70
0∗
∗∗
1.
70
0∗
∗∗
1.
49
9∗
∗∗
1.
48
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
45
)
M
aj
or
ity
C
hr
is
tia
n
-0
.0
71
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
71
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
99
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
M
aj
or
ity
M
us
lim
0.
03
2∗
∗∗
0.
03
2∗
∗∗
0.
02
2∗
∗
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
18
9∗
∗∗
0.
19
1∗
∗∗
0.
19
6∗
∗∗
0.
19
8∗
∗∗
0.
40
0∗
∗∗
0.
40
0∗
∗∗
0.
40
7∗
∗∗
0.
40
7∗
∗∗
0.
41
8∗
∗∗
0.
42
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
24
)
Y
ea
re
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
M
un
dl
ak
av
er
ag
e
te
rm
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
10
47
12
4
R
2
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
0.
01
5
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
0.
01
5
C
lu
st
er
s
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
1.
22
e+
05
rh
o
0.
54
8
0.
54
7
0.
54
8
0.
54
8
0.
40
5
0.
40
5
0.
40
5
0.
40
5
0.
41
0
0.
40
9
Pa
ne
lF
-T
es
t
12
1.
11
5
11
5.
88
9
72
.8
53
71
.1
47
B
re
us
ch
an
d
Pa
ga
n
L
M
te
st
fo
rr
an
do
m
ef
fe
ct
s
44
03
62
.9
1
44
03
61
.1
5
44
14
31
.4
6
44
14
30
.9
3
44
58
07
.5
8
43
95
17
.6
3
C
hi
-s
qu
ar
ed
11
17
8.
17
6
11
17
9.
86
7
11
26
4.
08
6
11
26
5.
98
1
76
76
.9
57
84
71
.9
53
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
ov
er
al
l
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
15
4
0.
15
4
0.
15
6
0.
15
6
0.
09
0
0.
09
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
be
tw
ee
n
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
18
2
0.
18
2
0.
18
3
0.
18
3
0.
10
7
0.
10
8
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
+
p
<
0
.1
,∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
0
1
.
(a
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
lo
g
of
(i
m
po
rt
s
in
to
th
e
U
S/
in
to
re
st
of
w
or
ld
)
(b
)
E
st
im
at
io
n
is
do
ne
at
6
di
gi
ts
on
po
si
tiv
e
flo
w
s.
(d
)
F-
te
st
s
of
th
e
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
ar
e
F-
te
st
(1
21
77
6,
92
53
26
)
=
6.
88
,F
-t
es
t(
12
17
76
,9
25
32
5)
=
6.
88
,F
-t
es
t(
12
17
76
,9
25
30
8)
=
6.
88
,F
-t
es
t(
12
17
76
,9
25
30
8)
=
6.
88
fo
r
th
e
fir
st
fo
ur
co
lu
m
ns
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
(e
)r
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
us
ed
21
Table 3: Heckman two step estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st-stage 2nd-Stage A 2nd-Stage B 1st-stage 2nd-Stage A 2nd-Stage B Poisson Poisson
AGOA product dummy 0.407∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.075) (0.134) (0.075) (0.004) (0.008)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.395 0.365 0.392 0.362 1.196∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.414) (0.462) (0.412) (0.142) (0.142)
CBTPA product dummy 0.353∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.074) (0.112) (0.074) (0.002) (0.003)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.083 -1.066 -1.088 -1.071 -5.252∗∗∗ -5.500∗∗∗
(0.888) (0.887) (0.886) (0.885) (0.415) (0.415)
GSP product dummy 0.111∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.109∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.011) (0.011)
CAFTA-DR -0.265∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -1.598∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.004) (0.004)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.303∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
agoa×year 2002 0.321+ 0.320+ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.170) (0.010)
agoa×year 2003 0.594∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.166) (0.008)
agoa×year 2004 0.159 0.156 0.169∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.162) (0.008)
agoa×year 2005 0.215 0.212 -1.548∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.174) (0.010)
agoa×year 2006 -0.278+ -0.279+ -0.891∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.167) (0.010)
agoa×year 2007 -0.299+ -0.299+ -2.763∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.164) (0.012)
agoa×year 2008 -0.560∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ -1.455∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.165) (0.010)
agoa×year 2009 -0.730∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -0.968∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.174) (0.012)
cbtpa×year 2001 0.019 0.019 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.123) (0.004)
cbtpa×year 2002 -0.389∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.005)
cbtpa×year 2003 -0.728∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.006)
cbtpa×year 2004 -1.071∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗ -0.938∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.006)
cbtpa×year 2005 -1.455∗∗∗ -1.452∗∗∗ -2.182∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.132) (0.007)
cbtpa×year 2006 -1.594∗∗∗ -1.592∗∗∗ -0.761∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.138) (0.007)
cbtpa×year 2007 -1.776∗∗∗ -1.777∗∗∗ -3.759∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.135) (0.015)
cbtpa×year 2008 -1.854∗∗∗ -1.858∗∗∗ -4.189∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.027)
cbtpa×year 2009 -1.951∗∗∗ -1.959∗∗∗ -2.207∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.018)
1st stage Residuals -5.545∗∗∗ -5.696∗∗∗ -5.966∗∗∗ -6.121∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.154) (0.162) (0.165)
GSP LDC country dummy -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GSP country dummy -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
CBI 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
AGOA country dummy -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Country’s RCA (log) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Military -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of free lines 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Margin (MFN and applied tariff) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Area (log) 0.031∗∗∗
(0.000)
Number of cities -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
latitude 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
landlocked -0.075∗∗∗
(0.001)
English Speaking 0.059∗∗∗
(0.002)
Spanish speaking 0.064∗∗∗
(0.003)
Majority Christian -0.039∗∗∗
(0.002)
Majority Muslim -0.101∗∗∗
(0.002)
Constant 0.141∗∗∗ 4.078∗∗∗ 4.178∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ 4.064∗∗∗ 4.157∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.105) (0.106) (0.003) (0.104) (0.105)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak average terms No No No Yes No No No No
Observations 2279844 1047124 1047124 2279844 1047124 1047124 1704878 1704878
R2 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.018
AdjustedR2 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.018
Clusters 1.63e+05 1.22e+05 1.22e+05 1.63e+05 1.22e+05 1.22e+05
rho 0.678 0.549 0.549 0.588 0.605 0.608
F-Test 483.580 84.726 139.692 85.054 140.306
Chi-squared 59328.491 3.07e+06 3.54e+06
R-squared overall 0.139 0.006 0.004 0.266 0.003 0.002
R-squared between 0.221 0.004 0.003 0.365 0.002 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. (a) Dependent variable is the log of (imports into the US/into rest of
world) (b) Estimation is done at 6 digits on positive flows (c) F-test of exclusion restrictions: F(3,162845)=45.34 and Chi-squared test χ2(5) = 3150.25 for columns (1)
and (4) respectively. Column 1 uses fixed effects and the exclusion restriction does not include religion. Column 4 has religion (christian and muslim) as additional exclusion
restrictions. The F-test (Chi-squared test) is a joint significance test of military, number of free lines, tariff margin and religion dummies (where applicable) (d) robust standard
errors used (except the Poisson case)
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Table 5: Random effects without selection correction and Heckman two step estimates for sub-sample of
countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mundlak-RE1 Mundlak-RE2 LPM1 2nd Stage1 LPM2 2nd Stage2
AGOA product dummy 0.409∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.391∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.133)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.079 -0.096 0.354 0.351
(0.578) (0.581) (0.450) (0.450)
CBTPA product dummy 0.397∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.350∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.616∗∗ -1.623∗∗ -1.046 -1.044
(0.552) (0.539) (0.872) (0.871)
GSP product dummy 0.147∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.122∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
agoa×year 2002 0.342+ 0.343+ 0.323+ 0.325+
(0.175) (0.176) (0.169) (0.169)
agoa×year 2003 0.725∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.174) (0.165) (0.165)
agoa×year 2004 0.347∗ 0.356∗ 0.155 0.159
(0.169) (0.169) (0.161) (0.161)
agoa×year 2005 0.429∗ 0.441∗ 0.231 0.237
(0.181) (0.181) (0.173) (0.173)
agoa×year 2006 -0.072 -0.058 -0.249 -0.243
(0.172) (0.172) (0.166) (0.166)
agoa×year 2007 -0.053 -0.038 -0.255 -0.247
(0.168) (0.168) (0.163) (0.163)
agoa×year 2008 -0.354∗ -0.338∗ -0.471∗∗ -0.469∗∗
(0.168) (0.168) (0.164) (0.164)
agoa×year 2009 -0.529∗∗ -0.515∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.175) (0.173) (0.173)
cbtpa×year 2001 0.040 0.040 0.015 0.015
(0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123)
cbtpa×year 2002 -0.382∗∗ -0.381∗∗ -0.378∗∗ -0.377∗∗
(0.125) (0.125) (0.122) (0.122)
cbtpa×year 2003 -0.739∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.132) (0.129) (0.129)
cbtpa×year 2004 -1.075∗∗∗ -1.071∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗ -1.020∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.138) (0.135) (0.135)
cbtpa×year 2005 -1.450∗∗∗ -1.444∗∗∗ -1.383∗∗∗ -1.375∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131)
cbtpa×year 2006 -1.652∗∗∗ -1.651∗∗∗ -1.556∗∗∗ -1.551∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.138) (0.138)
cbtpa×year 2007 -1.819∗∗∗ -1.817∗∗∗ -1.706∗∗∗ -1.700∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.135)
cbtpa×year 2008 -1.930∗∗∗ -1.928∗∗∗ -1.756∗∗∗ -1.752∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.134) (0.133)
cbtpa×year 2009 -2.074∗∗∗ -2.074∗∗∗ -1.859∗∗∗ -1.855∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.135)
CAFTA-DR -0.167∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.156∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Military -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
landlocked 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Area (log) -0.040∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of cities 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
latitude 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000+ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
English Speaking -0.022+ 0.005 0.030∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001)
Spanish speaking -0.098∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.003) (0.003)
Africa -0.094∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.227∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
GSP LDC country dummy -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GSP country dummy 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
CBI 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
AGOA country dummy -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Country’s RCA (log) 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of free lines 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Margin (MFN and applied tariff) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
1st stage residuals -7.542∗∗∗ -7.596∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.212)
Constant 0.398∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 5.383∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 5.505∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.003) (0.140) (0.003) (0.144)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Observations 565077 538946 1634346 565077 1606878 538946
R2 0.032 0.032
AdjustedR2 0.032 0.032
Clusters 78716.000 76762.000 1.17e+05 78716.000 1.15e+05 76762.000
rho 0.338 0.326 0.544 0.560 0.536 0.544
F-Test 74.980 74.123
Chi-squared 7788.668 7700.262 27277.604 23693.851
R-squared overall 0.143 0.143 0.260 0.010 0.241 0.013
R-squared between 0.160 0.160 0.371 0.010 0.349 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (a) Dependent variable is the
log of (imports into the US/into rest of world) and for the 1st Stage it is the probability of exporting to the USA (b) Estimation is done at 6
digits on positive flows, (c) 1 Excludes 33 OECD countries and remaining European countries, 2 China and Hong Kong are also excluded in
addition to the OECD and European countries. (d) Test of random effects is 226101.89 and 217337.84 for the first two columns respectively
(e) Chi-squared test of exclusion restrictions areχ2(3) = 227.92 andχ2(3) = 204.48 for columns (3) and (5) respectively. (f)
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Exponentiated coefficients calculated as (expβ −1)× 100
Figure 1: Summary of coefficients and impact of preference dummies
We now briefly discuss the results presented in Appendix II. The results presented here include HS-2 and
HS-4 digit results. What is striking in Table (7) is the sign reversal for the HS-4 digit estimates of AGOA
as well as similar sign reversals for CBTPA for HS-2 and HS-4 digit estimations. In terms of the AGOA
coefficient this is insignificant in the HS-4 digit column. A possible explanation might be the difficulty in
accurately determining the fraction of exports in that category exported under the preference. Nevertheless,
we notice that the correlation among the regressors increase at more disaggregated levels and is more severe
in the non apparel and textile regressions. Much of this correlation is due to the preference-time interac-
tions and the CBTPA preference included in the regressions. The HS-6 results are repeated in the tables for
comparative purposes. In Table (7), the impact of a country’s previous competitiveness has a larger effect
at the 6-digit level compared to the more aggregated 2- and 4-digit levels. Market size of the USA relative
to the world becomes negative at the other levels of disaggregation and also becomes insignificant (except
at the 2-digit level where it is marginally significant at 10%). the positive sign recorded for the 6-digit level
of disaggregation is significant at the 0.1% but the effect is small. The negative coefficient for the 2- and
4-digit levels probably indicates that at higher levels of aggregation the rest of the world tends to provide
a larger market relative to the USA. The AGOA preferences are negative and insignificant in the 4-digit
columns. They are however, significant in the 2-digit regressions in columns (2) and (5). The coefficients
are larger accounting for the aggregated nature of the data. The GSP dummy is insignificant in both the
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2-digit and 4-digit regressions—this might be due to the fact that countries are graduated or de-graduated
in products at the 6-digit level and not at higher levels of aggregation. On the contrary, the CBTPA dummy
is negative and significant in the 4-digit regressions but insignificant in the 2-digit regressions.
The next two tables present results from looking at non apparel and textile and apparel and textile prod-
ucts separately. Table (8) reports the fixed effects estimates while Table (9) reports the Mundlak corrected
random effects estimates. The two tables report similar estimates for our variables of interest. The AGOA
coefficient is significant and positive in both tables at the 6-digit level for non apparel products. However,
in Table (8) significance is at the 10% level and the coefficients of 0.017 and 0.036 (in Table (9) yield rel-
atively small impacts of 1.71% and 3.71% respectively. This significance was obtained after including the
time-preference interactions. The inclusion of the time-preference interactions also led to the exclusion of
the CBTPA coefficients. The exclusion of the time-preference dummies leads to a negative coefficient for
AGOA in the 6-digit level regressions. This compared to the apparel impact is relatively small in size. The
inability to estimate a coefficient for the CBTPA preference does not allow us to make any comments about
the impact of the preference. The 2- and 4-digit results are insignificant for the GSP and AGOA preferences.
The evidence thus far points to AGOA being more favourable to apparel and textile products. In Table (9)
all three regressions for the apparel and textile products yield coefficients for all three preferences. At the
6-digit level AGOA, CBTPA and GSP product dummies do lead to higher exports to the USA relative to the
rest of the world and are significant. At the 2-digit level the signs became negative for the GSP and CBTPA
preferences but remain positive and larger for AGOA. The 4-digit level estimates of AGOA are no longer
significant. The estimates for CBTPA and GSP are significant and negative. These results so far show that
care must be taken in choosing a level of disaggregation when analysing trade data. The 2-digit and 6-digit
levels of disaggregation tend to provide coefficients with the same sign compared to the 4-digit level coef-
ficients. In addition, the apparel and textile products seem to be the driving force behind the performance
of the AGOA and CBTPA preferences in our regressions.
Tables (10) and (11) carry out the Heckman selection and Poisson PMLE regressions respectively. The
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table (7). Table (12) summarises the impact of the
preferences across all five tables. The large impact of AGOA at the 2-digit level is the most noticeable
feature of the table. This large impact might be due to problems present in the regressions as result of the
aggregation of the 6-digit trade data. However, the remaining preferences do not present such outliers in
the impact of the preferences. The final set of tables, Tables (13) and (14) present the results from carrying
out estimations on selected countries. Table (13) reports the Mundlak corrected random effects estimates
while Table (14) does same for the Heckman second stage results. Among the AGOA countries (Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) Kenya posts a significant and positive coefficient. The remaining three
countries report insignificant coefficients. In terms of the CBTPA dummy, Guatemala and Honduras report
positive and significant coefficients in both tables. Costa Rica and Jamaica on the other hand, post insignif-
icant coefficient estimates. For these countries with insignificant estimates a much closer look at the data
and re-estimating the regressions to control for country specific shocks and controls might provide better
estimates of the impact. However, at the moment given our general model which is applied to the individual
countries, they seem not to have significantly increased their exports to the USA relative to the rest of the
world. Nigeria and South Africa might not show the significance due to the composition of their exports
and the fact that they do not benefit from the special textile preferences provided by the USA. Our choice
of products for South Africa are mostly exported under the GSP hence we observe a significant coefficient
for the GSP preference. On the contrary, for Ghana as shown in Figure (5) the share of AGOA exports in
exports to the USA has declined over time since the initial jump in 2001.
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We have presented results of various models to show the impact of USA’s preferences on developing coun-
tries. In doing this, we have controlled for the exports of these countries to the rest of the world to isolate
the impact of the preferences. The results after various robustness and sensitivity checks point to a positive
impact of AGOA and the CBTPA preferences of the USA on the exports of its beneficiaries to the USA.
Nonetheless, the USAs GSP preference is also increasing exports to the USA relative to the rest of the
world. Most of these results pointing to a positive impact can be attributed to the ability of the USA to
absorb imports from the world given its huge demand and consumption of its citizens. We do not however,
attribute causation to these results but would like to point out that these are the relative impacts given our
model and data.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to estimate the impact of the USA’s AGOA and CBTPA preferences on its
beneficiary countries. Adopting Collier and Venables (2007) methodology and making the required changes
to fit their methodology within our framework. We find a strong impact of the AGOA and CBTPA prefer-
ences. However, the CBTPA preferences is sensitive to the exclusion of the interaction of the preferences
and time. AGOA on the other hand is not and is robust to the exclusion of the AGOA preference-time inter-
action as well as the exclusion of some variables. HS-6 and HS-2 levels of disaggregation tend to provide
consistent estimates with the same signs and significance. The HS-4 disaggregation on the other hand,
tends to be sensitive and the signs switch around a lot. However, at higher levels of aggregation (HS-2) the
explanatory variables tend to be correlated with each other, especially the preference-time interactions and
the CBTPA preferences. Also, with the non apparel and textile regression, correlation among the variables
is higher and the concentration of exports in this cluster is less.
Using the ordinary random effects model leads to inconsistent estimates which in several cases are twice
the estimates of the fixed effects, Mundlak corrected random effects and Heckman selection models. The
Poisson PMLE estimates are also larger but they report much smaller standard errors affirming its popularity
in the current trade literature as an applied model of choice. The inclusion of preference-time interactions
increases the impact of the preferences . The increase is smaller in the other non Poisson models—but quite
larger—more than twice for the Poisson model. The Mundlak corrected random effects and fixed effects
estimates are quite similar to the Heckman model indicating that these models are good alternatives to the
Heckman model. An implication, is that non exporting is distributed randomly in our dataset. Thus, the
estimates not controlling for selection bias are not as severely biased as expected.
Studies based solely on the ordinary random effects model as shown by our analysis tend to overestimate
the impact of preferences. Increasing the sample size and allowing N to increase infinitely does not resolve
this inconsistency. However, the differences between the fixed effects, Mundlak corrected random effects
and Heckman selection models are not so different in very large samples. This holds because our sample is
relatively large and with fixed T—thus consistency holds for increasing N. Thus for fixed T but large N the
differences in estimates are quite small as the benefits of the large sample tends to lead us towards the true
parameters. In smaller N samples however, care needs to be taken in choosing the appropriate estimator to
obtain consistent estimates.
In concluding, we note that further work needs to be done in identifying the causal impact of the prefer-
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ences. Extensions to this paper to overcome the present short-coming includes exploring causality within
a matching framework. Matching allows the countries to be compared, such that, countries that are sim-
ilar before receiving the preferences are matched—to limit the differences in their exports to the USA to
the preference received. As at now, the impacts can be considered as intention to treat (ITT) as described
in the evaluation literature and not average treatment effects (ATE). Finally, a potential question for fur-
ther research is whether the move by the EU towards Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) at the end
of 2007 has transferred advantages enjoyed by the European Union-African Caribbean and Pacific (EU -
ACP) beneficiaries to their current status in the American market.
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14: Ghana, 17: Kenya, 27: Nigeria, 31: South Africa
Figure 5: AGOA Imports by the USA, by region
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(a) Ghana (b) Kenya
(c) Nigeria (d) Angola
Mean imports at the 6 digit level for free imports (zero tariffs), dutiable imports and specific duty imports respectively.
Source: TRAINS database
Figure 6: Mean Imports by Applied and MFN tariffs, Selected African Countries - 1996-2009
37
(a) Barbados (b) Costa Rica
(c) Jamaica
Mean imports at the 6 digit level for free imports (zero tariffs), dutiable imports and specific duty imports respectively.
Source: TRAINS database
Figure 7: Mean Imports by Applied and MFN tariffs, Selected Caribbean Basin Countries - 1996-2009
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(a) Ghana (b) Kenya
(c) Nigeria
Maximum imports at the 6 digit level for free imports (zero tariffs), dutiable imports and specific duty imports respectively. .
Source: TRAINS database
Figure 8: Maximum Imports by Applied and MFN tariffs, Selected African Countries - 1996-2009
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(a) Costa Rica (b) Barbados
(c) Jamaica
Maximum imports at the 6 digit level for free imports (no tariffs), dutiable imports and specific duty imports respectively.
Source: TRAINS database
Figure 9: Maximum Imports by Applied and MFN tariffs, Selected Caribbean Basin Countries - 1996-2009
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Appendix II
Table 6: List of Countries
Afghanistan Denmark Lesotho Russian Federation
Albania Dominica Liberia San Marino
Antigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Argentina Ecuador Luxembourg Senegal
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Macao Sierra Leone
Aruba El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Australia Estonia Madagascar Slovak Republic
Austria Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Malawi Slovenia
Azerbaijan Fiji Malaysia South Africa
Bahamas, The Finland Maldives Spain
Bahrain France Mali Sri Lanka
Bangladesh French Polynesia Malta St. Kitts and Nevis
Barbados Gambia, The Mauritania St. Lucia
Belarus Georgia Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium Germany Mexico Suriname
Belize Ghana Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Swaziland
Benin Greece Moldova Sweden
Bermuda Guatemala Mongolia Switzerland
Bhutan Guinea Morocco Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Guyana Mozambique Taiwan, China
Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti Myanmar Tajikistan
Botswana Honduras Namibia Tanzania
Brazil Hong Kong, China Nepal Thailand
British Virgin Islands Hungary Netherlands Togo
Brunei Iceland Netherlands Antilles Tokelau
Bulgaria India New Caledonia Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso Indonesia New Zealand Tunisia
Cambodia Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Turkey
Cameroon Ireland Niger Turkmenistan
Canada Israel Nigeria Uganda
Cape Verde Italy Norway Ukraine
Cayman Islands Jamaica Oman United Arab Emirates
Chile Japan Pakistan United Kingdom
China Jordan Palau Uruguay
Colombia Kazakhstan Panama Uzbekistan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Paraguay Venezuela
Cook Islands Korea, Rep. Peru Vietnam
Costa Rica Kuwait Philippines Yemen
Cote d’Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Poland Zambia
Croatia Lao PDR Portugal Zimbabwe
Cyprus Latvia Qatar
Czech Republic Lebanon Romania
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Table 7: Fixed/Random effects regression without selection correction
All Mundlack corrected RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE-HS6 FE-HS2 FE-HS4 RE-HS6 RE-HS2 RE-HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.384∗∗ 3.224∗ -0.105 0.416∗∗ 3.400∗ -0.015
(0.135) (1.440) (0.242) (0.136) (1.443) (0.238)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.429 -145.135∗ 0.730 0.022 -157.399∗∗ 0.571
(0.477) (56.855) (0.632) (0.564) (57.505) (0.607)
CBTPA product dummy 0.367∗∗ -0.446 -1.048∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ -0.364 -1.027∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.411) (0.193) (0.113) (0.403) (0.192)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.115 -5.249 -0.436 -1.561∗ -16.603 -0.934
(0.914) (39.091) (1.447) (0.617) (38.142) (1.404)
GSP product dummy 0.113∗∗ 0.219 -0.122 0.126∗∗ 0.228 -0.098
(0.040) (0.470) (0.143) (0.040) (0.470) (0.143)
CAFTA-DR -0.242∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.077) (0.075) (0.037) (0.077) (0.075)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.020) (0.010) (0.005) (0.020) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.008∗∗∗ -0.040+ -0.004 0.010∗∗∗ -0.039+ -0.003
(0.001) (0.021) (0.010) (0.001) (0.021) (0.010)
agoa×year 2002 0.328+ † 0.050 0.335+ † -0.035
(0.173) (0.256) (0.175) (0.254)
agoa×year 2003 0.636∗∗∗ † 0.299 0.710∗∗∗ † 0.204
(0.168) (0.313) (0.172) (0.304)
agoa×year 2004 0.195 † -0.097 0.305+ † -0.180
(0.165) (0.463) (0.167) (0.440)
agoa×year 2005 0.232 † -0.035 0.368∗ † -0.120
(0.177) (0.333) (0.179) (0.320)
agoa×year 2006 -0.270 † 0.138 -0.141 † 0.150
(0.170) (0.461) (0.171) (0.511)
agoa×year 2007 -0.282+ † -0.067 -0.142 † -0.150
(0.167) (0.357) (0.167) (0.335)
agoa×year 2008 -0.579∗∗∗ † -0.025 -0.451∗∗ † -0.099
(0.168) (0.515) (0.168) (0.491)
agoa×year 2009 -0.727∗∗∗ † -0.653 -0.616∗∗∗ † -0.727
(0.177) (0.559) (0.175) (0.530)
cbtpa×year 2001 0.027 † 0.149 0.035 † 0.121
(0.124) (0.324) (0.125) (0.315)
cbtpa×year 2002 -0.398∗∗ † 0.748∗ -0.391∗∗ † 0.722∗
(0.124) (0.361) (0.124) (0.353)
cbtpa×year 2003 -0.756∗∗∗ † 0.429 -0.744∗∗∗ † 0.393
(0.131) (0.402) (0.132) (0.395)
cbtpa×year 2004 -1.107∗∗∗ † 0.391 -1.110∗∗∗ † 0.365
(0.138) (0.492) (0.138) (0.485)
cbtpa×year 2005 -1.503∗∗∗ † -0.047 -1.505∗∗∗ † -0.065
(0.135) (0.439) (0.135) (0.430)
cbtpa×year 2006 -1.657∗∗∗ † 0.148 -1.676∗∗∗ † 0.112
(0.140) (0.353) (0.141) (0.344)
cbtpa×year 2007 -1.841∗∗∗ † 0.328 -1.861∗∗∗ † 0.288
(0.137) (0.403) (0.137) (0.395)
cbtpa×year 2008 -1.941∗∗∗ † 0.393 -1.982∗∗∗ † 0.358
(0.136) (0.347) (0.136) (0.338)
cbtpa×year 2009 -2.071∗∗∗ † 0.454 -2.114∗∗∗ † 0.400
(0.138) (0.523) (0.138) (0.514)
landlocked ‡ ‡ ‡ 0.076∗∗∗ † 0.621∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.056)
Area (log) ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.015∗∗∗ † -0.127∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.011)
Number of cities ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.005∗∗∗ † -0.017∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
latitude ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.002∗∗∗ † -0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
English Speaking ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.029∗∗∗ † 0.025
(0.009) (0.052)
Spanish speaking ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.156∗∗∗ † -0.890∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.084)
Africa ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.041∗∗∗ † 0.825∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.069)
Latin America & Caribbean ‡ ‡ ‡ 0.282∗∗∗ † 1.591∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.097)
NAFTA ‡ ‡ ‡ 1.713∗∗∗ † 0.859∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.119)
Constant 0.196∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 2.363∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.182) (0.135)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047124 20163 113997 1047124 20163 113997
R2 0.015 0.021 0.023
AdjustedR2 0.015 0.020 0.022
Clusters 1.22e+05 1872.000 14029.000 1.22e+05 1872.000 14029.000
rho 0.548 0.826 0.827 0.405 0.774 0.778
F-Test 72.853 5.004 18.316
Chi-squared 10622.224 661.396 3156.275
R-squared overall 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.155 0.201 0.179
R-squared between 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.183 0.197 0.171
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Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of (imports
into the US/into rest of world) Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows F test of fixed effects for columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively:
F-test(121776,925309) = 6.89 , F-test(1871,18270) = 23.55, F-test(14028,99930) = 17.12. † indicates variable dropped in estimation ‡ indicates not applicable
Table 8: Fixed effects regression without selection correction-Non apparel and Apparel & Textiles
Non Apparel Apparel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HS6 HS2 HS4 HS6 HS2 HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.017∗ -0.079 -0.281 0.380∗∗ 3.287∗ -0.128
(0.008) (1.042) (0.266) (0.136) (1.456) (0.242)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.118+ † † 0.510 -150.157∗ 1.897
(0.068) (0.507) (60.564) (1.282)
CBTPA product dummy † † † † † †
cbtpa×gsp product dummy † † † † † †
GSP product dummy 0.209+ 0.430 0.391 0.102∗ 0.202 -0.247+
(0.117) (0.912) (0.447) (0.042) (0.496) (0.135)
CAFTA-DR -0.139+ -0.294∗ -0.442 -0.258∗∗∗ -0.219∗ -0.637∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.145) (0.410) (0.042) (0.086) (0.074)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.001 -0.026 -0.059 0.116∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.064) (0.039) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.148 0.109∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.002) (0.098) (0.039) (0.001) (0.018) (0.009)
agoa×year 2002 -0.032∗∗ † -0.033 0.329+ † 0.111
(0.011) (0.059) (0.174) (0.264)
agoa×year 2003 -0.013 † † 0.633∗∗∗ † 0.270
(0.011) (0.168) (0.322)
cbtpa×year interactions † † † † † †
Constant 0.139∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.093) (0.060) (0.005) (0.032) (0.022)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139290 2685 12335 907834 17478 101662
R2 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.029 0.027
AdjustedR2 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.028 0.027
Clusters 18551.000 225.000 1844.000 1.03e+05 1647.000 12185.000
F-Test . . . 71.793 4.983 19.082
R-squared within 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.029 0.027
R-squared between 0.004 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.010 0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of
(imports into the US/into rest of world). Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26 Apparel
and Textiles: HS50 - 63 F test of fixed effects for columns 1-6 respectively: F-test(18550,120718) = 8.6 , F-test(224,2442) = 29.83, F-test(1843,10472) =
16.93, F-test(103225,804570) = 6.78 , F-test(1646,15810) = 22.32, F-test(12184,89439) = 16.84. † indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡ indicates not
applicable
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Table 9: Random effects regression with Mundlak’s correction-Non apparel and Apparel & Textiles
Non Apparel Apparel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HS6 HS2 HS4 HS6 HS2 HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.036+ -0.035 -0.288 0.409∗∗ 3.444∗ -0.036
(0.020) (1.062) (0.268) (0.136) (1.458) (0.239)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.163∗ † † 0.090 -161.322∗∗ 1.587
(0.076) (0.597) (61.106) (1.253)
CBTPA product dummy † † † 0.383∗∗∗ -0.352 -1.008∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.405) (0.191)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy † † † -1.529∗ -17.059 -0.896
(0.618) (38.388) (1.391)
GSP product dummy 0.201+ 0.430 0.383 0.118∗∗ 0.211 -0.223+
(0.119) (0.915) (0.450) (0.042) (0.496) (0.134)
CAFTA-DR -0.105 -0.291∗ -0.353 -0.240∗∗∗ -0.218∗ -0.622∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.144) (0.404) (0.041) (0.086) (0.074)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.002 -0.029 -0.049 0.126∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.065) (0.037) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.149 0.111∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.001) (0.099) (0.038) (0.001) (0.018) (0.009)
agoa×year 2002 -0.031∗∗ † -0.006 0.336+ † 0.014
(0.011) (0.059) (0.175) (0.263)
agoa×year 2003 -0.012 † † 0.707∗∗∗ † 0.179
(0.011) (0.173) (0.311)
agoa×year 2004 † † † 0.301+ † -0.200
(0.168) (0.450)
agoa×year 2005 † † † 0.366∗ † -0.131
(0.180) (0.327)
agoa×year 2006 † † † -0.140 † 0.133
(0.171) (0.516)
agoa×year 2007 † † † -0.138 † -0.172
(0.167) (0.341)
agoa×year 2008 † † † -0.443∗∗ † -0.128
(0.168) (0.486)
agoa×year 2009 † † † -0.611∗∗∗ † -0.745
(0.175) (0.543)
cbtpa×year 2001 † † † 0.037 † 0.100
(0.125) (0.315)
cbtpa×year 2002 † † † -0.390∗∗ † 0.701∗
(0.125) (0.352)
cbtpa×year 2003 † † † -0.743∗∗∗ † 0.369
(0.132) (0.395)
cbtpa×year 2004 † † † -1.103∗∗∗ † 0.347
(0.138) (0.485)
cbtpa×year 2005 † † † -1.492∗∗∗ † -0.075
(0.135) (0.430)
cbtpa×year 2006 † † † -1.647∗∗∗ † 0.114
(0.141) (0.344)
cbtpa×year 2007 † † † -1.828∗∗∗ † 0.284
(0.138) (0.395)
cbtpa×year 2008 † † † -1.943∗∗∗ † 0.368
(0.137) (0.337)
cbtpa×year 2009 † † † -2.075∗∗∗ † 0.408
(0.138) (0.514)
landlocked -0.031∗∗∗ † -0.040 0.094∗∗∗ † 0.682∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.226) (0.008) (0.058)
Area (log) 0.002 † -0.162∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ † -0.128∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.039) (0.002) (0.011)
Number of cities 0.005∗∗ † 0.040+ -0.006∗∗∗ † -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.006)
latitude 0.001∗ † 0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ † -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
English Speaking 0.070∗∗∗ † 0.461∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ † -0.022
(0.017) (0.162) (0.010) (0.055)
Spanish speaking -0.003 † -0.149 -0.182∗∗∗ † -1.059∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.243) (0.018) (0.087)
Africa -0.036∗∗ † 0.326 -0.042∗∗∗ † 0.868∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.199) (0.008) (0.072)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.262∗∗∗ † 2.256∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ † 1.522∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.326) (0.018) (0.099)
NAFTA 1.658∗∗∗ † -0.433 1.714∗∗∗ † 1.083∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.352) (0.043) (0.121)
Constant -0.134∗∗ 0.637 1.154∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 2.505∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.544) (0.526) (0.026) (0.189) (0.138)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139290 2685 12335 907834 17478 101662
Clusters 18551.000 225.000 1844.000 1.03e+05 1647.000 12185.000
rho 0.407 0.671 0.773 0.408 0.795 0.773
Chi-squared . . . 10580.612 642.643 3017.242
R-squared overall 0.111 0.153 0.175 0.159 0.232 0.193
R-squared between 0.126 0.219 0.174 0.189 0.200 0.185
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of (imports into the
US/into rest of world). Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26 Apparel and Textiles: HS50 - 63. †
indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡ indicates not applicable
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Table 11: Poisson FE Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-HS6 2-HS6 3-HS6 3-HS2 1-HS4
US/World Import ratio
AGOA product dummy -0.263 0.972∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 28.248∗∗ -0.163
(9132.504) (0.008) (0.008) (8.629) (105.378)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.448 2.889∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗ -422.761 †
(9132.032) (0.142) (0.142) (993.389)
GSP product dummy 1.176∗∗∗ -1.601∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗ -81.923∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (8.359) (0.025)
CAFTA-DR -0.362∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗ 4.190∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.048) (0.008)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) -0.379∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.256∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021) (0.001)
agoa×year 2002 -0.500 0.320∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ † -0.050
(167.738) (0.010) (0.010) (167.738)
agoa×year 2003 -2.085 1.047∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ † †
(24768.914) (0.008) (0.008)
agoa×year 2008 -5.911 -0.108∗∗∗ -1.455∗∗∗ † †
(2.03e+05) (0.011) (0.010)
agoa×year 2009 -3.930 -0.778∗∗∗ -0.968∗∗∗ † †
(2.03e+05) (0.012) (0.012)
CBTPA product dummy † † † † †
cbtpa×gsp product dummy † † † † †
cbtpa×year interactions † † † † †
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259714 1445164 1704878 26208 25830
log likelihood -6.77e+06 -8.77e+06 -1.67e+07 -7.18e+04 -1.56e+06
Chi-squared 3.88e+06 1.68e+06 3.54e+06 1.35e+05 1.82e+06
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Estimation is done at 6 digits and 2
digits - 1=Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26; 2=Apparel and Textiles: HS50 - 63 3=Full: combines all 6 (2) digit products for both apparel and
non apparel in our sample. † indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡ indicates not applicable
Table 12: Summary impact of preferences estimated in Tables 2 – 5 in percent
GSP AGOA CBTPA CAFTA-DR
Table 1
2 digit (FE) 24.49 2411.77 -36.00 -20.78
4 digit (FE) -11.44 -9.92 -64.94 -46.18
6 digit (FE) 12.00 46.84 44.38 -21.52
2 digit (Mundlak) 25.56 2895.24 -30.51 -20.60
4 digit (Mundlak) -9.36 -1.50 -64.18 -45.21
6 digit (Mundlak) 13.39 51.57 48.37 -19.88
Table 2
2 digit (Non Apparel) 53.76 -7.56 † -25.51
4 digit (Non Apparel) 47.89 -24.53 † -35.72
6 digit (Non Apparel) 23.29 1.71 † -12.98
2 digit (Apparel) 22.40 2575.05 -34.99 -19.66
4 digit (Apparel) -21.92 -12.04 -64.38 -47.11
6 digit (Apparel) 10.69 46.20 42.86 -22.72
Table 3
2 digit (Non Apparel) 53.76 -3.48 † -25.27
4 digit (Non Apparel) 46.66 -25.01 † -29.73
6 digit (Non Apparel) 22.23 3.71 † -9.95
2 digit (Apparel) 23.47 3030.98 -29.67 -19.55
4 digit (Apparel) -20.00 -3.55 -63.50 -46.31
6 digit (Apparel) 12.49 50.58 46.62 -21.36
Table 4
2 digit (Column 4) 26.59 3670.83 -27.75 -18.56
4 digit (Column 6) -12.22 -6.66 -63.82 -50.34
6 digit (Column 2) 11.69 50.25 42.32 -23.30
2 digit (Column 10: Mundlak) 24.91 3424.60 -28.82 -19.02
4 digit (Column 12: Mundlak) -10.87 -5.87 -64.95 -45.66
6 digit (Column 8: Mundlak) 11.55 49.94 43.17 -23.32
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Calculated as (expβ −1)× 100. † implies coefficient was dropped by the software.
Table 13: Random effects regression without selection correction for selected countries–HS6 digits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Costa Rica Ghana Guatemala Honduras Jamaica Kenya Nigeria South Africa
AGOA product dummy -0.816 1.195∗ 0.044 -0.019
(0.540) (0.586) (0.157) (0.075)
agoa×gsp product dummy
CBTPA product dummy 0.406 0.429∗ 0.897∗ 0.213
(0.284) (0.194) (0.406) (0.757)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy
GSP product dummy -1.262∗ 0.043 0.207 -0.056 -0.151 0.089 0.298 0.130+
(0.513) (0.809) (0.747) (0.345) (0.167) (0.099) (0.339) (0.071)
agoa×year 2002 0.706 0.387 -0.069 -0.013
(0.823) (0.790) (0.044) (0.066)
agoa×year 2003 1.457 0.454 -0.162∗∗ -0.011
(0.991) (0.716) (0.051) (0.047)
agoa×year 2004 0.402 0.107 -0.204∗∗∗
(0.887) (0.797) (0.061)
agoa×year 2005 -0.155 0.163 -0.013 -0.346∗∗∗
(0.758) (0.758) (0.051) (0.069)
agoa×year 2006 0.514 -0.329 -0.406∗∗∗
(0.759) (0.755) (0.074)
agoa×year 2007 0.813 -0.497 -0.070 -0.454∗∗∗
(0.625) (0.798) (0.055) (0.075)
agoa×year 2008 -0.432 -0.315 -0.478∗∗∗
(0.552) (0.865) (0.076)
agoa×year 2009 -0.311 -0.162 -0.474∗∗∗
(0.597) (0.850) (0.075)
cbtpa×year 2001 0.118 -0.008 -0.044 0.181
(0.365) (0.237) (0.465) (0.731)
cbtpa×year 2002 0.013 -0.192 -0.357 0.353
(0.385) (0.244) (0.444) (0.737)
cbtpa×year 2003 -0.114 -0.596∗ -0.774+ 0.069
(0.381) (0.248) (0.447) (0.850)
cbtpa×year 2004 -0.159 -0.772∗∗∗ -0.707+ 0.499
(0.354) (0.230) (0.413) (0.867)
cbtpa×year 2005 -0.306 -1.135∗∗∗ -1.185∗∗ 0.127
(0.349) (0.234) (0.423) (0.943)
cbtpa×year 2006 -0.234 -1.060∗∗∗ -2.181∗∗∗ 0.701
(0.349) (0.259) (0.433) (0.985)
cbtpa×year 2007 -0.052 -1.403∗∗∗ -1.879∗∗∗ -1.606+
(0.369) (0.234) (0.433) (0.958)
cbtpa×year 2008 -0.557 -1.403∗∗∗ -1.876∗∗∗ -0.888
(0.369) (0.227) (0.407) (1.074)
cbtpa×year 2009 -0.995∗∗ -1.675∗∗∗ -2.127∗∗∗ -1.396
(0.344) (0.247) (0.412) (0.864)
CAFTA-DR -0.050 0.018 -0.254+
(0.081) (0.091) (0.132)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 1.126∗∗∗ -0.008 0.355∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗ 0.056∗
(0.149) (0.119) (0.055) (0.087) (0.231) (0.049) (0.035) (0.023)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.047 -0.030+ 0.030+ -0.013 -0.006 0.019∗∗ 0.001 0.005+
(0.030) (0.019) (0.016) (0.035) (0.037) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Constant 0.172∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ -0.107 0.085+ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.028+
(0.083) (0.108) (0.078) (0.099) (0.137) (0.045) (0.056) (0.016)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5974 3748 8662 5896 2891 8384 6127 12778
Clusters 797.000 706.000 917.000 807.000 550.000 953.000 894.000 981.000
rho 0.184 0.053 0.350 0.244 0.081 0.125 0.000 0.154
Chi-squared 548.339 134.826 713.135 10895.267 196.873 612.368 . 144.190
R-squared overall 0.239 0.122 0.285 0.269 0.359 0.241 0.035 0.064
R-squared between 0.282 0.180 0.310 0.294 0.383 0.420 0.057 0.145
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 14: Heckman two step estimator for selected countries (second stage estimates)–HS6 digits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Costa Rica Ghana Guatemala Honduras Jamaica Kenya Nigeria South Africa
AGOA product dummy -0.626 1.180∗ 0.052 -0.038
(0.444) (0.516) (0.145) (0.075)
agoa×gsp product dummy
CBTPA product dummy 0.425 0.366+ 0.819∗ 0.263
(0.277) (0.188) (0.378) (0.718)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy
GSP product dummy -0.541∗∗∗ -0.184 0.140 0.667 -0.023 0.068 0.270 0.101
(0.131) (0.714) (0.730) (0.610) (0.142) (0.071) (0.309) (0.072)
CAFTA-DR -0.036 -0.409∗∗∗ -1.059∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.112) (0.201)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.332∗ -0.125 -0.038 -0.110 0.820∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.102∗∗ -0.007
(0.139) (0.132) (0.050) (0.091) (0.205) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.068∗ -0.037+ 0.047∗∗ -0.006 0.033 0.027∗∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗
(0.031) (0.020) (0.017) (0.037) (0.045) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
agoa×year 2002 0.896 0.189 -0.069 0.002
(0.720) (0.684) (0.047) (0.065)
agoa×year 2003 1.075 0.251 -0.118∗ -0.005
(0.833) (0.619) (0.054) (0.047)
agoa×year 2004 -0.096 -0.263 -0.192∗∗
(0.686) (0.711) (0.060)
agoa×year 2005 -0.765 -0.162 0.028 -0.337∗∗∗
(0.656) (0.664) (0.054) (0.068)
agoa×year 2006 -0.133 -0.467 -0.400∗∗∗
(0.678) (0.676) (0.073)
agoa×year 2007 0.146 -0.590 0.015 -0.450∗∗∗
(0.590) (0.718) (0.064) (0.074)
agoa×year 2008 -0.598 -0.733 -0.340∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.791) (0.097)
agoa×year 2009 -0.535 -0.325 -0.453∗∗∗
(0.578) (0.781) (0.076)
cbtpa×year 2001 -0.005 0.005 -0.136 -0.014
(0.361) (0.230) (0.454) (0.725)
cbtpa×year 2002 0.075 -0.141 -0.349 0.118
(0.377) (0.228) (0.412) (0.678)
cbtpa×year 2003 0.185 -0.425+ -0.814+ 0.007
(0.362) (0.235) (0.427) (0.805)
cbtpa×year 2004 0.075 -0.593∗∗ -0.537 0.445
(0.336) (0.224) (0.396) (0.822)
cbtpa×year 2005 -0.170 -0.841∗∗∗ -1.021∗ 0.233
(0.341) (0.225) (0.398) (0.879)
cbtpa×year 2006 -0.115 -0.835∗∗ -1.847∗∗∗ 1.111
(0.350) (0.254) (0.405) (0.894)
cbtpa×year 2007 -0.008 -1.042∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗∗ -1.448
(0.363) (0.225) (0.417) (0.967)
cbtpa×year 2008 -0.368 -1.146∗∗∗ -1.542∗∗∗ -0.297
(0.368) (0.221) (0.390) (1.103)
cbtpa×year 2009 -0.753∗ -1.344∗∗∗ -1.724∗∗∗ -0.415
(0.347) (0.242) (0.397) (1.044)
1st stage residuals -13.491∗∗∗ -7.494+ -11.615∗∗∗ -13.370∗∗∗ -10.338∗∗∗ -9.173∗∗∗ -7.039∗ -5.199∗
(1.569) (4.215) (1.216) (1.416) (1.733) (1.280) (3.103) (2.540)
Constant 9.755∗∗∗ 6.479∗ 8.468∗∗∗ 10.570∗∗∗ 7.879∗∗∗ 7.028∗∗∗ 5.713∗ 3.523∗
(1.045) (3.137) (0.765) (0.965) (1.238) (0.945) (2.404) (1.680)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5974 3748 8662 5896 2891 8384 6127 12778
R2 0.136 0.027 0.090 0.135 0.242 0.062 0.017 0.041
AdjustedR2 0.132 0.021 0.087 0.131 0.235 0.059 0.014 0.039
Clusters 797.000 706.000 917.000 807.000 550.000 953.000 894.000 981.000
rho 0.436 0.396 0.545 0.476 0.381 0.376 0.194 0.322
F-Test 10.604 1.920 9.906 . 5.885 . . 4.650
R-squared overall 0.180 0.005 0.183 0.169 0.348 0.130 0.017 0.005
R-squared between 0.212 0.082 0.177 0.162 0.339 0.197 0.008 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. 1st stage results not reported here.
